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WHO NEEDS CONTRACTS? 
GENERALIZED EXCHANGE WITHIN 
INVESTMENT ACCELERATORS 
BRAD BERNTHAL*
Abstract 
This Article investigates why an expert volunteers on behalf of startups that 
participate in a novel type of small venture capital (“VC”) fund known as a 
mentor-driven investment accelerator (“MDIA”).  A MDIA organizes a pool 
of seasoned individuals – called “mentors” – to help new companies.  An obvi-
ous organizational strategy would be to contract with mentors.  Mentors in-
stead voluntarily assist.  Legal studies of norm-based exchanges do not explain 
what this Article calls the “mentorship conundrum”—i.e., the puzzling moti-
vation of a mentor to volunteer within otherwise for-profit environments.  This 
Article is the first to bridge the insights of generalized exchange theory with 
law and entrepreneurship.  Generalized exchange, which describes systems 
when benefits are not directly returned by a recipient but by another member 
of a group, best explains how MDIAs induce volunteerism.  Original research 
reveals that the absence of contract promotes a feeling of altruism while facili-
tating economically valuable aspects of mentor / startup interaction. Mentors 
realize indirect benefits that function as a consideration surrogate.  Mentor re-
wards include reputation gains, learning benefits, and enhanced professional 
connections.  The MDIA provides a study of how pro-social information shar-
ing occurs in a commercial setting. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Colorado Law; Director of the Entrepreneurship Initiative, Sil-
icon Flatirons Center. Disclosures: the author has served as a mentor with Techstars Boulder 
since 2008. The author also taught as a co-professor with Sue Heilbronner, a principal of the 
MergeLane accelerator program. Individuals affiliated with Techstars and MergeLane are fi-
nancial supporters of the Silicon Flatirons Center and Colorado Law. For helpful comments 
and ideas, thank you to Peter Bell, John Bernthal, Deborah Cantrell, Daniel Cooper, John 
Coyle, Vic Fleischer, Erik Gerding, Cathy Hwang, Tim Kuhn, Orly Lobel, Sharon Matusik, 
Jason Mendelson, Helen Norton, Paul Ohm, Scott Peppet, Elizabeth Pollman, Pierre Schlag, 
Andrew Stock, Mike Weinheimer, Phil Weiser, Yesha Yadav, Xin (“Eva”) Yao, participants 
in the Law and Entrepreneurship Workshop (San Diego, CA, January 2016), colleagues who 
joined the Colorado Law School’s Works In Progress session (Boulder, CO, March 2016), the 
University of Colorado-Boulder Entrepreneurship Group (March 2016), and participants in 
the Colorado Law’s Junior Business Law Scholar’s Conference (Boulder, CO, July 2016). Ad-
ditionally, thank you to Tyler Park and Malea McKeown for research assistance. This Article 
is dedicated to my father, John Bernthal. Any errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The mentor-driven investment accelerator (a “MDIA”) presents a 
conundrum for those who study entrepreneurial deals.1  From a finance 
1. This is the second part of a two-part investigation into investment accelerators.  A 
companion article examines opportunism issues where participants openly share infor-
mation amid informal accelerator environments.  See Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators,
22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 139 (2016) [hereinafter Bernthal, Investment Accelerators].
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2017] WHO NEEDS CONTRACTS? 999 
perspective, an investment accelerator is effectively a small venture cap-
ital (“VC”) firm that invests in a portfolio of private startups and aims 
to profitably return capital to investors.2  A MDIA pools together 
roughly seventy-five experienced individuals—called “mentors”—who 
work closely with startup founders.3  Mentorship involves valuable in-
formation exchange between seasoned experts and MDIA portfolio 
companies.4  MDIAs dramatically expand the number of startups that 
obtain access to entrepreneurial expertise.5
Therein lays the mentorship conundrum.  Why do highly qualified 
individuals give away free help to a for-profit company (a startup) 
nested within a small VC fund (an investment accelerator)?  A “step 
zero” consideration for lawyers and business people is whether to use 
legal tools to organize collaboration.6  An obvious MDIA organizational 
2. An investment accelerator may be more specifically classified as a specific sub-species 
of VC firm, known as a “super angel” fund.  See discussion infra Part II. 
3. The average number of “active” mentors in a MDIA network is sixty-nine.  Interview 
with Patrick Riley, Chief Executive Officer, GAN network, in Boulder, Colo. (June 17, 2016) 
(notes on file with author).  MDIA networks commonly range in size from 60–120 mentors.  
See discussion infra Part II. 
4. A MDIA “portfolio company” is a startup that participates in an investment acceler-
ator.  The term “portfolio company” mirrors nomenclature of private equity and venture cap-
ital, which refers to companies that their funds invest in as portfolio companies.  ANDREW
METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 3 (2006).  A startup is an en-
trepreneur-driven firm that aims to solve a pain through scalable innovation amid conditions 
of extreme uncertainty.  This definition captures the type of company that accelerators gen-
erally target for selection. See generally RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH PAD: INSIDE Y-
COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY’S MOST EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR STARTUPS 67 (2012). See Bern-
thal, Investment Accelerators, supra note 1, at 142, n.8; see discussion infra Part II.
5. The defining dimension of MDIAs, in terms of institutional innovation, is that they 
democratize expert mentorship to startups on an unprecedented scale, reaching a greater 
number of startups, across a wider range of geographies, and spanning more industry sectors 
than predecessor institutions. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
6. “Step zero” refers to an inquiry required to determine whether a framework should 
be applied to a given situation.  Administrative law contemplates a “Chevron Step Zero”— 
i.e., an initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework of deference applies at all.  See
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).  In arranging collaboration, 
a step zero inquiry refers which organizational approach should be used, a decision that must 
be made before determining how to use organizational mechanisms.  Ronald Coase’s classic 
make vs. buy distinction underscores alternative organizational approaches.  The theory of 
the firm bifurcates the use of contracts within a market (i.e., “buy”) versus integration of re-
sources within a firm hierarchy (i.e., “make” or “build”).  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA (N.S) 386, 386-87 (1937).  Network governance and social norms literature 
shows that informal mechanisms are also available to organize collaboration and resource 
exchange. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organi-
zation, 12 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 295, 322 (1990). 
39285-m
qt_100-3 Sheet No. 169 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 169 Side B      06/19/2017   09:53:44
C M
Y K
7 BERNTHAL-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/12/17 2:03 PM
1000 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:997 
strategy would be to contract with mentors.7  Experts in a startup mar-
ket environment could secure cash or equity in exchange for service as 
a startup board director, an advisory board member, a service provider, 
or a consultant.8  Mentors instead commonly contribute absent legal 
agreement and, moreover, a mentor does not typically secure cash or 
equity consideration (i.e., neither an accelerator nor a startup directly 
compensates a mentor).9  Thus a mentor—a crucial source of experience 
and professional connections within MDIAs—serves as a volunteer in a 
for-profit world.  A conservative estimate is that a three to four month 
MDIA program attracts over $1 million in mentor contributions.10  It is 
unclear how MDIAs make these valuable exchanges work without con-
tracts.
I investigated the behavior of mentors through series of over sixty 
interviews conducted in 2015–16.  This original research shows that in-
formal arrangements promote a “veil of altruism.”11  This promotes vol-
unteerism even as it masks economic aspects of mentor / portfolio com-
pany exchanges.  The result is a mixed-motive environment where 
indirect benefits function as a consideration surrogate to mentors.  A 
theory well developed in sociology and anthropology, generalized ex-
change, best explains how MDIAs work.  This Article is the first to 
bridge the insights of generalized exchange with law and entrepreneur-
ship literature. 
7. Experts possess scarce resources that are desired by startup entrepreneurs.  An ex-
pert’s connections and tacit knowledge, for example, are not fungible.  A challenge for new 
entrepreneurs, especially those outside of startup rich geographies, is a lack of access to ex-
perts.  Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe & Michael Leatherbee, The Effects of Business Accelerators on 
Venture Performance: Evidence from Start-Up Chile 28 (June 16, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651158 [https://perma.cc/7S9A-N3YG]. 
8. A unique feature of a MDIA is that, while a portfolio company directly enters into a 
financial agreement with a MDIA, mentor expertise provided to the portfolio company is 
provided outside of contractual agreements. Legal scholarship accounts of entrepreneurial 
finance, such as Gilson’s study of venture capital, places strong emphasis on the role of con-
tracts to organize collaboration. See e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: 
Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003).  In traditional VC 
settings, a portfolio company directly enters into a financial agreement with a VC fund, and 
one of the fund’s managing directors provides expertise to the portfolio company. 
9. That is, a mentor engages with portfolio companies outside the boundaries of privity. 
See discussion infra Part II. 
10. See discussion infra Part II. 
11. “Organizations that facilitate generalized exchange readily produce a kind of veil of 
altruism around the movement of resources.”  Robb Willer et al., Structure, Identity, and Soli-
darity: A Comparative Field Study of Generalized and Direct Exchange, 57 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 119, 148 
(2012).
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Sphero, a startup founded in 2010, is an emerging company buoyed 
by volunteer experts.  In 2015, Sphero produced the Star Wars BB-8 toy, 
a miniature version of the blockbuster movie’s drone robot controlled 
via a user’s smart phone.12  Sphero’s journey includes many aspects 
common to a successful emerging company: a talented team, hard work, 
some luck,13 and new opportunities made possible by technology.  But 
Sphero had one more element working in its favor: participation in two 
MDIA programs.  Sphero met its current CEO Paul Berberian through 
the Techstars Boulder accelerator.14  Subsequent participation in the Dis-
ney accelerator helped the company land the BB8 deal.15  Almost every-
one – Sphero, its founders, and the MDIAs who invested in the company 
– benefitted from this arrangement.16  Everyone, it would seem, except 
for most of the mentors who volunteered insights and connections with-
out securing direct benefits in return.17
Why MDIA mentors volunteer is a contestable matter. Implied reci-
procity is one possible explanation.18  This would characterize mentor-
ship as a form of direct economic exchange with an implicit quid pro quo.
But reciprocity is not how mentorship works.  Accelerator norms spec-
ify that mentee portfolio companies are not obliged to provide direct 
value back to a mentor, let alone return value that is commensurate to 
the value of expert mentorship.19  This leads some mentors to view men-
12. BB-8, SPHERO, http://www.sphero.com/starwars/bb8 [https://perma.cc/753E-
7URB] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
13. During a visit to Boulder, President Obama played with an early robotics toy. This 
brought some welcome attention to the startup’s product.  See John Aguilar, Obama Surprises 
The Sink During Boulder Visit, Gets Accidental Yogurt Splash, DAILY CAMERA (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_20473325/obama-surprises-sink-gets-accidental-yogurt-
splash [https://perma.cc/W5PJ-X47G]. 
14. Sphero is now on its 8th round of financing and has raised nearly $80 million in 
outside funding. Sphero, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/or-
botix#/entity (last visited Aug. 10, 2016). 
15. Daniel Roberts, How Sphero brought a Star Wars droid from screen to toy, FORTUNE (Sept. 
3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/sphero-star-wars-droid-toy/
[https://perma.cc/R4FA-8T53].
16. Id.
17. Of course, one mentor, CEO Paul Berberian, directly benefitted from his role as a 
mentor.  But most others who volunteered time for Sphero neither own stock nor did they 
receive direct financial compensation.  See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #5 
(Apr. 8, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
18. Mentors could, for example, help portfolio companies with the implicit understand-
ing that help will be returned on a time deferred basis. 
19. See David Cohen, The Mentor Manifesto, HI, I’M DAVID G. COHEN (Aug. 28, 2011), 
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torship as a public-spirited contribution.  But research shows that men-
torship is not an exercise in pure altruism either.20  Something more 
complex is going on with MDIAs. 
Legal scholarship does not account for MDIA mentorship. Law and 
society scholars highlight “order without law” instances where informal 
norms and extralegal systems substitute for private contracts.21  Studies 
document anecdotal conditions where order without law lowers par-
ties’ net transaction costs while reputational sanctions substitute for 
contract to limit opportunistic behavior.22  Along these lines, in prior 
work I analyzed issues associated with opportunism in MDIAs.23  That 
work described the organizational structure of Investment Accelerators 
and explained how MDIAs play a role as a norm generator and norm 
enforcer, allowing reputational sanctions to substitute for contract. 
Yet the foregoing legal scholarship does not resolve the mentorship 
conundrum. Findings of reduced transaction costs in norm-based ex-
changes do not explain experts’ motivation to work in for-profit envi-
ronments absent direct consideration.24  Other lines of legal literature, 
http://davidgcohen.com/2011/08/28/the-mentor-manifesto/ [https://perma.cc/9HQL-
4J9Q].
20. See discussion infra Parts III and IV. 
21. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Obligations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 157 (1992) (discussing opting out of the public 
legal system); Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle];
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 ISJLP 1, 7, 12(2012) (also dis-
cussing opting out of the public legal system and citing examples of social norms of trust and 
market responses to reputation for reneging as sources of “economic relational services”); 
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV.
55, 55–56 (1963) (highlighting the significance of social relationships). Relevant legal scholar-
ship is further discussed infra Section III.A. 
22. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64
DUKE L.J. 605, 609 (2015); Bernstein, supra note 21, at 157. 
23. Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, supra note 1, at 140. 
24. Formal contracts and other legal agreements resolve a social dilemma by promising 
a benefit—i.e., consideration—to prompt a party’s participation.  Further, a contract militates 
against free rider problems by prescribing obligations to be borne in exchange for receiving 
a benefit.  Most order without law accounts fail to describe how benefits induce collaborator 
participation in instances where a beneficiary is not obligated to directly reciprocate a bene-
factor.  In contrast, benefits of collaboration are discussed in negative legal spaces scholarship 
about intellectual property and human capital.  See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting 
Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
123–24, (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy 
Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2006); 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 318–19
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such as incomplete contracts and braiding, also fail to solve the mentor-
ship conundrum.25  Incomplete contract theories explain uncertain con-
ditions that lead parties to risk ex post contractual disputes in order to 
save on ex ante contracting costs.26  Braiding literature documents un-
certain environments where parties agree to procedural frameworks 
that build trust even as particulars of yet-unknown innovations are left 
underspecified.27  But MDIA mentorship differs in two respects from 
incomplete contracts and braiding. First, a mentor does not enter in to a 
contract at all.28  Second, a mentor does not participate in a simple two-
party exchange.29  A more panoramic perspective about the MDIA net-
work helps explain how MDIA mentor / startup exchanges function. 
This Article’s central thesis is that generalized exchange theory pro-
vides valuable insights that best explain the mentorship conundrum.  
“Generalized exchange refers to the indirect giving and receiving of 
benefits among three or more people who belong to the same group, 
organization, or network.”30  In generalized exchange, a “benefit given 
to a person is reciprocated not by the recipient but by someone else in 
(2011).  Relatedly, Orly Lobel chronicles how experts and new companies interact in a variety 
of contexts that eschew formal intellectual property protection measures, bypass human cap-
ital controls, and minimize formal contracts. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE:
WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 7 (2013). 
25. See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281,
281–82 (2016); see also Ronald Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Inter-
action of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1377, (2010) [hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding]; Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing In-
definite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (2003) [hereinafter Scott, Self-Enforcing
Agreements]; Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Con-
tract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Incomplete 
Contracts].
26. Parties willing to trade lower front-end transactional costs for higher potential back-
end enforcement costs enter into incomplete contracts. See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, Incomplete 
Contracts, supra note 25, at 190. 
27. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 25, at 1384; Ronald Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & 
Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435–37 (2009) [hereinafter Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation].
28. See infra Section III.A. 
29. See infra Section III.A. 
30. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121 (citing BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF 
THE WESTERN PACIFIC (1922)); PETER P. EKEH, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY: THE TWO
TRADITIONS (1974); Toshio Yamagishi & Karen S. Cook, Generalized Exchange and Social Dilem-
mas, 56 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 235, 235–48 (1993); Peter Bearman, Generalized Exchange, 102 AM. J.
SOC. 1383, 1383–415 (1997).  Generalized exchange stands in contradistinction to direct ex-
change, such as a bilateral contract, where two actors trade benefits with one another. No-
buyuki Takahashi, The Emergence of Generalized Exchange, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1105, 1106 (2000). 
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the group . . . .”31  Generalized exchange deepens insight about why in-
dividuals and firms engage in pro-social behavior, even when such be-
havior appears in tension with maximizing a party’s near-term eco-
nomic self-interest.32  Two prominent MDIA characteristics attend 
generalized exchange: (1) unilateral giving, and (2) indirect return of 
benefits.33
Unilateral giving occurs where a MDIA mentor does not expect di-
rect consideration in return from a portfolio company that benefits from 
the mentor’s help.34  Instead, mentors trust that they will indirectly re-
ceive benefits—sooner or later—from someone else, either within or 
outside of the MDIA network.  Original research shows that, even as 
social norms operate in the absence of contract, mentors realize econom-
ically significant professional rewards that substitute for contractual 
consideration.35  This Article traces the movement of indirect benefits.  
An expert mentor feels like a volunteer. But at the same time an expert 
mentor: (i) strengthens relationships with other mentors (such as inves-
tors and serial entrepreneurs); (ii) realizes learning benefits such as see-
ing technology and investment trends across MDIA companies; and (iii) 
enjoys reputational gains vis-à-vis third parties outside of the MDIA 
network.36
This Article makes two scholarly contributions. One, it is the first to 
document how MDIAs institutionalize generalized exchange.37  This in-
31. Peter Kollock, The Economies of Online Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in Cyber-
space, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 223 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999) (dis-
cussing peer production as a form of generalized exchange). 
32. See generally Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 91, 102 (2015) (“It is a mistake to conflate relational with altruistic.  In this con-
text, relational means the tendency toward both cooperation and competition. An economic 
actor can and will be both pro-social (cooperative) and anti-social (opportunistic).”). 
33. Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1105; Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Con-
tract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.J. 645, 654 (2012) (“Generalized exchange involves more 
than a dyadic relation.”). 
34. A MDIA does not preclude the possibility of direct benefits from a portfolio com-
pany to a mentor.  Rather, a direct benefit becomes a future option that a mentor and mentee 
may mutually exercise in the future.  See discussion infra Part III.
35. This is significant where for-profit entities, such as MDIAs and their portfolio com-
panies, privately appropriate gains that flow from volunteer help.  See discussion infra Part
II.
36. See infra Part IV. 
37. In this respect, this Article draws upon and contributes to relational contract schol-
arship that locate transactions on a relational scale ranging from discrete to highly relational. 
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vestigation shows how MDIAs’ version of startup finance mingles mar-
ket benefits with social norms.38  Two, outside of law and entrepreneur-
ship, generalized exchange deepens legal scholars’ understanding of 
pro-social behavior.39  Generalized exchange is rarely studied within le-
gal scholarship.40  Yet, generalized exchange reveals much about how 
and why profit-oriented parties share information.  This potentially 
could enrich other lines of legal scholarship, such as investigations of 
why parties eschew or minimize legal tools that could secure exclusive 
Study of the relational dimensions of contract—as examined by Macauley, Macneil and oth-
ers—emphasizes the social context of collaboration.  See Macaulay, supra note 21; Ian Macneil, 
Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 888, 901 (2000); Ci-
mino, supra note 32. 
38. Other valuable studies analyze economically significant innovation generated by in-
dividuals who do not fully capture wealth created by the innovation. See generally ERIC VON 
HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005) (documenting and explaining user based inno-
vation); Powell, supra note 6, at 322. 
39. See, e.g., LYNN A. STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE 4 (2011).  Stout critiques conventional economic wisdom that most “people act like 
members of the species homo economicus: they act selfishly and rationally.”  Along similar 
lines, Orly Lobel draws upon law and behavioral economics to document the nuance of com-
mercial actors’ behavior and motivations. See LOBEL, supra note 24, at 178–81.  Research in 
other disciplines support the view the pro-social behavior is often an effective strategy within 
commercial contexts. For an overview of organizational behavior literature that questions 
homo economicus assumptions, see ADAM GRANT, GIVE AND TAKE: A REVOLUTIONARY
APPROACH TO SUCCESS 169–70 (2013), explaining why generous individuals who use “other-
ish” strategies perform better than selfish actors in corporate contexts. Connections between 
generalized exchange and pro-social commercial behavior is discussed further, infra Section 
III.B.
40.  A notable exception is Healy & Krawiec, supra note 33, at 647–48, which provides 
extended treatment of generalized exchange theory in examining kidney donor regimes.  Cer-
tain disciplines use the closely related term “generalized reciprocity.” See, e.g., Wayne E. 
Baker & Nathaniel Bulkley, Paying It Forward vs. Rewarding Reputation: Mechanisms of Gener-
alized Reciprocity, 25 Org. Sci. 1493 (2014) (giving extended treatment of generalized reciproc-
ity in organizational behavior literature).  In the well-known book Bowling Alone, Robert Put-
nam explains generalized reciprocity as “I’ll do this for you know without expecting anything 
immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the road 
you or someone else will return the favor.” See John Simonett, Civility and “Generalized Reci-
procity”, Bench & B. Minn., Feb. 2003, at 27, 28–29 (citing ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE
(1st ed. 2000)).Aside from Healy and Krawiec, legal scholars rarely examine generalized ex-
change or generalized reciprocity in close detail.  Generalized reciprocity is glancing refer-
enced in certain descriptions of economic production and open source software.  See e.g., 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 1, 11 (2012) (summarizing motivations to collaboration apart from “economic incentive 
of a property interest”); Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2014) (describing open source settings of “self-enforcing swift trust 
which is based on generalized reciprocity between group members”).
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intellectual property or direct economic benefits.41
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Following this Introduction, Sec-
tion II provides a primer on investment accelerators and mentor / 
startup relationships.  Next, Section III describes generalized exchange.  
Section IV then applies descriptive features of generalized exchange to 
reveal mentor motivation. Generalized exchange rewards a mentor par-
ticipant in two economically valuable ways: (i) internal indirect benefits
realized by a mentor from another MDIA participant; and (ii) external
indirect benefits appropriated by a mentor vis-à-vis a third party outside 
of a MDIA.  Finally, Section V examines steps that MDIAs take to struc-
ture and promote generalized exchange.  The MDIA is only a decade 
old. It remains to be seen whether this institutional form will stand the 
test of time. Section V distills the determinants of when a MDIA’s gen-
eralized exchange is sustainable versus where volunteerism will likely 
fail over the long haul.  This contributes to understanding of where for-
mal contracting tools are—and are not—required to induce participa-
tion in information-based exchanges. 
II. MDIAS INSTITUTIONALIZE THE ORGANIZATION OF VOLUNTEER HELP
TO STARTUPS
This Section details who participates in MDIAs as well as the phases 
of interaction between startups and expert mentors. Subpart A provides 
a short primer on accelerators.  Subpart B then describes how MDIAs 
harness mentors’ free contributions.  The summary is illustrative, not 
comprehensive, in providing a snapshot of how mentors and startup 
portfolio companies interact within a MDIA. 
41. Scholarship that examines instances where parties eschew or minimize legal tools 
includes “negative legal spaces” and peer production literature.  Anthony Casey and Andrew 
Sawicki argue that informal rules often function better than formal rules in fostering creativ-
ity. See Anthony Casey & Andres Sawicki, The Problem of Creative Collaboration 1 (Coase-San-
dor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics, Working Paper, 2016), http://chicagoun-
bound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2486&context=law_and_economics 
[https://perma.cc/AF7B-5KXH] (arguing that “informal rules functioning through mecha-
nisms like reputation and trust can sustain an organizational solution without a manager, a 
hierarchical firm, or formal law allocating control rights”). On peer production, see, for ex-
ample, Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer Production,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 971 (2009) [hereinafter Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin]; Yochai 
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 372 (2002) 
[hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].  Part III of this Article addresses how generalized ex-
change relates to negative legal spaces and peer production. 
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A. A Short Primer on the Accelerator 
The accelerator is a relative newcomer among startup support insti-
tutions.  A startup is an “organization formed to search for a repeatable 
and scalable business model.”42  Startups operate under severe resource 
constraints.  Key inputs from outside the boundaries of a fledgling firm 
must fulfill functions for which a startup lacks in-house capability.  Ac-
celerators proliferated over the past decade following the launch of Y-
Combinator, widely regarded as the first accelerator in 2005, and 
Techstars, another accelerator pioneer, which in 2007 developed the 
MDIA model and subsequently scaled it across geographies.43 Growth 
has been fast.44  Over 5,000 startups participated in accelerators between 
2005 and 2015.45  An accelerator combines many elements of pre-existing 
institutions and professional services that fill startup gaps by provision 
of specialized resources.46  Accelerators provide a fixed term of intensive 
help—usually three to four months—to portfolio companies.47  Help in-
cludes entrepreneurial expertise, funding, work space and facilities,48
peer-to-peer learning among entrepreneurs in portfolio companies, and 
introductions to potential customers and funders.49
42. STEVE BLANK & BOB DORF, THE STARTUP OWNER’S MANUAL: THE STEP-BY-STEP
GUIDE FOR BUILDING A GREAT COMPANY 23 (2012). 
43. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 142, 151–52 (discussing genealogy of accelerators). Def-
initional skirmishes exist concerning the definition of accelerators.  In short, an accelerator is 
distinguished from an incubator on two grounds.  One, accelerators help companies in lock-
step on a fixed time frame, while an incubator typically accepts companies on a rolling basis. 
Two, an investment accelerator provides financing to a startup.  An incubator may charge a 
startup in exchange for space and assistance. Id.
44. See Yael V. Hochberg, Accelerating Entrepreneurs and Ecosystems: The Seed Accel-
erator Model 16 (Apr. 3, 2015) (conference draft), http://yael-hochberg.com/assets/portfo-
lio/IPEHochberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R9E-J2D8].
45. See Cali Harris, Selling Social Capital: United States-Based Accelerators That Sell So-
cial Capital and the Startup Entrepreneurs Who Buy It 3–4 (Spring 2016) (unpublished M.S.S. 
thesis, University of Colorado) (on file with author). 
46. For example, venture capitalists and angel investors provide financing by connect-
ing sources of outside capital to new companies. Incubators and co-working spaces arrange 
physical facilities tailored to startup needs. Fractional finance, marketing, and legal provid-
ers tailor professional services to startups. 
47. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 148. 
48. Many accelerators are members of Global Accelerator Network (GAN) and are able 
to offer startups third-party perks from GAN sponsors totaling over $800,000. Join Us, GAN,
http://gan.co/join-us [https://perma.cc/6DHR-BKMP] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
49. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 161–62; Harris, supra note 45, at 2; Hochberg, supra note
44, at 14. 
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Investment accelerators are a permutation of the VC industry.50  A 
common arrangement is that an IA bundles $25,000 and non-financial 
help to a portfolio company in exchange for a 5–7% ownership stake.51
An IA’s financial success hinges—at least in part52 —around profitable 
outcomes that flow from ownership in portfolio companies.  Thus, an 
investment accelerator is a version of a “super angel” fund, effectively 
a small VC firm that seeks to invest in a portfolio of startups and profit-
ably return capital from early stage portfolio companies to limited part-
ners.53
The MDIA systematically organizes informal expert help to startups. 
Mentors are “ahead” of entrepreneurs in professional experience and 
network connections.54  While MDIA mentorship may be surprising to 
those unfamiliar with startup practices, volunteer help is not as novel 
within entrepreneurial communities as one might expect.55  MDIAs 
50. Venture capitalists are intermediaries that match outside sources of capital and ex-
pertise to startups.  Bernthal, supra note 1, at 151–52.  The accelerator landscape can be divided 
into two camps from an entrepreneurial finance perspective: non-investment accelerators 
(NIA) and investment accelerators (IA).  NIAs do not seek profit through equity ownership 
in startups. NIAs instead prioritize objectives that may include community economic devel-
opment, entrepreneurial education, social impact, or affinity group support. In contrast, IAs 
take partial ownership in its startups. Id. at 142. 
 A notable variation to the NIA model is that used by the non-profit Chicago New Venture 
Challenge (NVC).  Startups in this university-run program compete for part of a million in 
cash prizes and in-kind services.  When a winning team either raises the next round of fund-
ing or exits the company, NVC takes a small piece of the equity, based on a valuation, so that 
funds come back into the program to help sustain and support it.  Telephone Interview by 
Malea McKeown with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #25, (June 8, 2016) (notes on 
file with author). 
51. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 160–61; Hochberg, supra note 44, at 7.
52. In addition to returns from portfolio companies, there are three additional sources 
of possible MDIA revenue.  One is that the MDIA solicits sponsorships, such as financial 
contributions from legal providers, accounting providers, and software providers.  Two is 
that many MDIAs are paid to “power” (i.e., operate and organize) corporate accelerators.  
Three, MDIAs that raise investment funds sometimes take a small management fee. Harris, 
supra note 45.  While these three additional sources of revenue may be material for MDIAs, 
the majority of a MDIA’s success or failure will hinge on returns from portfolio companies. 
53. Super angels are prolific investors in early stage companies.  While a “regular” angel 
investor uses his or her own money, a super angel typically invests money on behalf of a 
fund.  David Mangum, Bringing Angel Investing Out of the Shadows 3 (May 12, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2285575 [https://perma.cc/L24U-
DV6L]. 
54. See Harris, supra note 45. 
55. Many economically valuable relations occur beyond the boundaries of contractual 
protection and, without more, it is unsurprising to find informal collaboration.  The surpris-
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build on a pre-existing behavior norm in certain startup geographies. 
For example, Bill Campbell—known as “Coach”—mentored many 
startups and figures in Silicon Valley, including early assistance to 
Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin.56  Along similar lines, in 
1976, Mike Markkula was a business person who gave away free help 
to startups on a regular basis.57  Upon the suggestion of venture capital-
ist Don Valentine, Markkula helped a young entrepreneur named Steve 
Jobs write a business plan early in the lifecycle of Apple Computers.58
Beyond instances of ad hoc help, regional development initiatives devel-
oped similar programs of volunteer assistance.  For example, 
CONNECT San Diego prominently notes that it “helps entrepreneurs 
with expert guidance, access to capital, and the business tools they 
need.”59  Studies of San Diego’s regional economic development empha-
size that CONNECT, founded in 1985,60 fostered social networks critical 
to nurturing San Diego’s economic growth.61
The MDIA extends pre-existing behavior norms of volunteerism in 
two innovative ways.  The MDIA: (i) pools mentor volunteers available 
to help portfolio company entrepreneurs as part of its for-profit business 
model; and (ii) organizes mentorship across geographies at a scale that, 
ing aspect of MDIAs is that informal mechanisms prevail in a for-profit context where com-
petitive innovation objectives are paramount, where private interests capture the gains of 
fruitful collaboration, and where formal contractual alternatives are familiar and readily 
available.  These traits distinguish MDIAs, for example, from volunteer work for a non-profit 
board with a public mission.  Further, the direct beneficiary in a MDIA is not an individual, 
but a company (a startup) nested within a larger for-profit company (an investment acceler-
ator).  This distinguishes MDIA mentorship from other types of professional mentoring such 
as that available to new attorneys through a bar association. 
56. As a New York Times obituary noted, “Strikingly, Mr. Campbell’s advisory role was 
often unpaid, at his insistence; he said he wanted to pay back what he felt was a debt to the 
nation’s technology region.”  John Markoff, Bill Campbell, Coach of Silicon Valley Stars, Dies at 
75, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/business/bill-camp-
bell-coach-of-silicon-valley-stars-dies-at-75.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NQ99-3TBE]. 
57. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 75–78 (2011). 
58. Id. Markkula was ultimately rewarded with a significant equity stake and an early 
role with Apple. 
59. About CONNECT, CONNECT, http://www.connect.org/about-connect 
[https://perma.cc/2J5Z-926M] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017) (emphasis added).  Founded in 1985, 
CONNECT is rooted in efforts to bolster the San Diego regional economy.  Academic leaders 
at UC San Diego teamed with Qualcomm founder Irwin Jacobs and other community leaders 
to establish a program to provide access for startups to key experts and outside resources.  
CONNECT remains active thirty years later.  Id.
60. Id.
61. Mary L. Walshok, et al., Building Regional Innovation Capacity: The San Diego Experi-
ence, 16 INDUSTRY & HIGHER EDUC. 27 (2002).
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in the aggregate, expands the number of entrepreneurs with access to 
expert resources.62  Of interest is that the MDIA organizational strategy 
to assemble volunteer experts did not organically emerge worldwide. 
Instead the leading industry association, the Global Accelerator Net-
work (“GAN”), crafted a MDIA playbook based primarily on the model 
of Techstars, a high prestige accelerator organization that originated in 
Boulder, Colorado.63  The MDIA form of organization has now been rep-
licated by over 100 accelerator programs across disparate locations.64
MDIAs operate in large cities such as New York City; international lo-
cales such as Cairo, Egypt; and even locations with limited numbers of 
experienced technology entrepreneurs.65  Vast differences in accelerator 
reputation, business cultures, technology capabilities, and background 
norms of behaviors exist across these locations.66
MDIAs lead a broad trend in startup volunteerism. An increasingly 
common feature of the 21st Century startup world, even observable out-
side of MDIAs, is to assemble expert help in open information sharing 
environments.67  In addition to MDIAs, other entrepreneurial support 
62. A serial entrepreneur and investor in Colorado relayed to me that accelerators took 
something that was already happening in the startup community and “just made it bigger . . . 
a lot bigger.”  Interview with Jim Franklin, in Boulder, Colo. (Sept. 17, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
63. GAN is an organization that spun out of Techstars.  As of July 2016, GAN has 122 
accelerator members in its network, each of whom has a strong mentorship component.  In-
terview with Patrick Riley, supra note 3. 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. A minor example: a managing director in Cairo, Egypt reported that his accelerator 
uses the informal mentor structure, however, there is not an equivalent translation for the 
“mentor” position in Arabic.  So, he noted, they use the word “mentor.”  Telephone Interview 
with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #16 (Apr. 7, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
67. Efforts to spur innovation from the federal research laboratories, for example, lean 
heavily on individuals who do not charge for their services. New Incubator Network to Help 
Clean-Energy Entrepreneurs, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2015/16455 [https://perma.cc/8HQ5-WGCG]. 
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institutions offer pre-assembled expert rosters available to assist bio-
technology startups,68 energy companies coming out of federal labora-
tories,69 university spin outs,70 corporate incumbents,71 and even com-
panies that boast $5-10 million in annual revenues.72  The ever-
expanding roles played by volunteer experts in the startup economy is 
not yet well studied.  It remains to be seen whether increasing institu-
tionalization of volunteerism will prove sustainable over the long 
term.73
68. LIFE SCIENCE TENN., http://www.lifesciencetn.org/?page=LifeSciTnMentor 
[https://perma.cc/S34T-FKCG] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
69.  New Incubator Network to Help Clean-Energy Entrepreneurs, supra note 67. 
70. Finance 629, U. OF MICH. CTR FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP, http://ipvid-
eos.engin.umich.edu/resources/finance-629 [https://perma.cc/L9WP-9UW4] (last visited 
Jun. 5, 2017); Innovation & Entrepreneurship New Venture Challenge, U. COLO. BOULDER,
http://cunvc.org/ [https://perma.cc/5BQ8-QT4G] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017).  University in-
cubators and accelerators rely upon experts to assist startups moving off the campus. Hack-
a-thons mingle expert volunteers who work alongside newcomers to an entrepreneurial com-
munity.
71. Do or Do Not, There is No Try, DISNEY ACCELERATOR, http://disneyaccelerator.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/F4PV-FKRE] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
72. BLACKSTONE ENTREPRENEURS NETWORK, http://www.bencolorado.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/FLB7-W34B] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017).  Notably, free help is not limited 
to new startups. The Blackstone Entrepreneurs Network, for example, specializes in arrang-
ing tailored volunteer help from experts to so-called Gazelle companies that already have $5-
10M in annual revenues.  Healthbox, a healthcare IA, previously used a fixed-structure that 
attracted pre-seed startups. Responding to the needs of their partner corporations, the pro-
gram now focuses on startups that are ready to put technology into hospitals and may al-
ready have customers and are generating revenue.  Telephone Interview by Malea McKeown 
with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #24 (June 8, 2016) (notes on file with author). 
73. During the course of this research, one accelerator principal asked me “when will 
the shakeout occur?” By shakeout the principal meant the closing or consolidation of accel-
erators.  The likely answer is that a shakeout or consolidation will occur around the time in 
which the first accelerator funds need to (or should be) returned to LPs.  At that point, MDIA 
investors will have visibility about (i) individual program accelerator investment perfor-
mance, and (ii) accelerator investments as an asset class.  Separate from private investment 
accelerators, Europe has aggressively followed Startup Chile in the government sponsored 
accelerator model as an economic development strategy.  In those circumstances, continua-
tion of government funding becomes a political question, with some ties to economic impact. 
On European accelerators and governmental involvement, see, e.g., Bruce Brown, Europe ac-
celerates startup accelerators, while US remains on cruise control, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 15, 2016, 
3:04 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/europe-us-canada-startup-accelera-
tors/#ixzz4ckKGRDto [https://perma.cc/EPM5-YA4M] (noting government involvement 
such that a “significant part of the European Commission’s $900 million annual budget for 
startups goes to accelerators”). 
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B. MDIAs Help Startups Harness Voluntary Mentor Contributions 
Semi structured interviews were conducted to study and better un-
derstand how accelerators organize mentor networks and, further, how 
startup and mentors interact.  This Article is informed by sixty-four in-
terviews from 2015–16.  Interviews spanned three types of accelerator 
participants: (i) sixteen interviews were with entrepreneurs;74 (ii) seven-
teen interviews were with mentors;75 and (iii) thirty-one interviews 
were with accelerator representatives.76  Interviewees were promised 
anonymity in order to promote candid feedback. 
Interviews reveal the institutional details about MDIA mentor in-
volvement.  This subsection highlights three dimensions of mentor net-
works: (1) experts voluntarily opt into a shared mentor pool; (2) mentor 
and startups often self-select one another; and (3) four different types of 
mentors participate.  Each dimension is described in detail below.  
1. MDIAs organize experts into a mentor network. 
An accelerator has three alternatives in how engage experts, as 
shown in Figure 1.77  Each of these models are presented in a stylized 
fashion, however, in practice they may be used in combination and are 
not mutually exclusive. 
74. Fourteen of these entrepreneurs led startups that participated in a MDIA.  Anony-
mous Entrepreneurs #4 and #10 did not participate in a mentor drive accelerator. 
75. All but one of these mentors were involved in a MDIA.  Anonymous Mentor #6 did 
not participate in a mentor driven accelerator. 
76. All but one of these accelerator representatives were involved in a MDIA.  Anony-
mous Accelerator Representative # 31 led an accelerator that is not mentor-driven.  Further, 
Anonymous Accelerator Representative # 17 led an accelerator that relied upon mentors who 
were compensated with equity. 
77. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 144–45.  Strategic organizational decisions about how 
to procure expert assistance may occur at the accelerator level or at the firm level of the 
startup.
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Figure 1: Alternative Ways to Organize Expert Help78
Employee
(Make)
Contract (Buy) Volunteer
(Network)
Accel-
erator / 
Expert
Ar-
range-
ment
Accelerator
hires expert full 
time (e.g., as 
Managing Di-
rector or Entre-
preneur-in-
Resident); ex-
pert works with 
multiple port-
folio companies
Accelerator and 
expert enter into 
an agreement 
where expert of-
fers help in con-
sideration for pay-
ment (often an 
equity interest in 
the accelerator co-
hort)
Accelerator
assembles a 
pool of ex-
perts, known 
as mentors, 
who are avail-
able to help 
portfolio
companies in 
a cohort
Portfo-
lio Co / 
Expert
Ar-
range-
ment
Portfolio com-
pany hires ex-
pert full time 
“in-house” as 
an employee, 
board director, 
and/or C-level 
officer
Portfolio com-
pany engages ex-
pert through a 
contract for part-
time assistance, 
such as an advi-
sory board role, a 
consultant ar-
rangement, or a 
professional ser-
vice provider
Portfolio
company and 
expert infor-
mally meet; 
expert offers 
assistance
The mentor-driven accelerator model is the most widespread among 
IAs overall as well as among highly ranked IAs.79  Under the mentor-
78. Id. at 155.
79. Numerically speaking, “The [mentor-driven] Boulder model has won.”  Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, (Apr. 15, 2015) (notes on file with author). This men-
tor is closely involved in both Y-Combinator and Techstars programs.  One estimate is that 
about 80% of investment accelerators world-wide are mentor driven. Interview with Patrick 
Riley, supra note 3.  The Global Accelerator Network, led by Riley, has 122 members, each of 
whom uses the MDIA model.  To be clear, this is not a claim that one model is more successful 
on average than the other.  Data for this does not yet exist.  See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 153 
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driven model, experts do not usually secure direct compensation for 
their efforts.80  MDIA mentor contributions have the legal status of a 
gift.81  Portfolio companies operate in knowledge intensive enterprises 
and a mentor’s contribution to a startup is information oriented.82  Un-
like physical products and tangible resources, “information doesn’t get 
used up even when it is consumed.”83  The non-rival character of infor-
mation means that a mentor’s contribution is not fully given away: what 
is contributed in the way of an information-based insight may well be 
used again by the mentor.84
The aggregate of mentors’ contributions is central to a MDIA’s value 
proposition.  A startup finds significant value in an accelerator’s finan-
cial investment, reputational signals associated with accelerator partici-
pation, and provision of work space.85  IAs often contend, however, that 
their most important value to a portfolio company is the information 
exchanges facilitated between startups and experts outside the startup 
firm.86  Expertise and access to a mentor’s social capital are central fea-
tures of an accelerator’s value to portfolio companies.87
n.65.
80. The term “coach” is common to accelerator nomenclature to refer to an individual 
who is paid for sharing entrepreneurial expertise with a portfolio company.  Interview with 
Patrick Riley, supra note 3. 
81. The term “gift” describes something done or promised gratuitously outside of a con-
tract. Consideration, an essential element of a contract, is “something of value given in return 
for a performance or promise of performance that is bargained for; consideration is what 
distinguishes a contract from a gift.”  Deli v. Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996) (citing Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960)). Tax law defines a 
gift as “a voluntary transfer of property by a donor to a donee, without full consideration.” J.
MARTIN BURKE ET AL., LEXIS EXPLANATION IRC SEC. 2511(A), Lexis (database updated 2016). 
The main focus in the tax practice area is the proper valuation and reporting of the donated 
services to non-profits.  A noncash “gift-in-kind” includes a category for services of volunteer 
workers.  See D. Edward Martin, ATTORNEY’S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING, § 9.02, 6 (Matthew Bender ed., 4th ed. 2015). 
82. To date accelerators have largely focused upon internet, mobile and software indus-
tries where information and novel ideas are crucial inputs. 
83. Information production, whether a startup idea or an open source software effort, 
involves “quirky” attributes that distinguish the character of knowledge inputs from tangible 
resources.  Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 404. 
84. “[C]reative works are non-rival in their consumption in as much as consumption by 
one person does not mean there is any less—of a book, for instance—to be consumed by 
another person.”  Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 975. 
85. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 157–58. 
86. Harris, supra note 45. 
87. Id. at 3 (observing that “accelerators sell social capital, and startup entrepreneurs 
buy it”). 
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An accelerator cohort commonly includes ten startups at a time.88  A 
MDIA expert network achieves critical mass at an 8:1 ratio of mentors 
to startups.89  A mentor commonly works with a startup company two 
to four hours per week.90  A portfolio company in turn collects multiple 
mentors’ contributions.  For startups the aggregate of these inputs totals 
around five to six hours per week.  For accelerators a conservative esti-
mate is that a single MDIA program attracts over $1 million in volunteer 
expert contributions over a three to four month program.91
MDIA pooling of experts benefits startups. In the absence of acceler-
ator (or similar) participation, a startup must seek out and engage ex-
perts on an ad hoc basis for assistance.92  Four benefits are provided by 
a mentor pool over ad hoc interactions.  One, a MDIA lowers search and 
contracting costs, at least relative to alternative strategies to reach ex-
perts, such as community networking or formal engagement of advisors 
at the company’s outset.93  The MDIA provides a portfolio company ac-
cess to a pool of pre-screened mentors with certified areas of relevant 
expertise.94  This reduces search costs. Further, the mentor pool side-
steps contracting costs early in a startup’s lifecycle, a time of high un-
certainty when value of an expert’s contributions would be difficult to 
delineate and quantify ex ante. Meanwhile, acceptance into the acceler-
ator indicates that a portfolio company has been vetted and likely to get 
attention to from mentors who might not otherwise meet with them.95
Relatedly, a startup business often shifts strategy quickly, an event 
88. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 148. 
89. A range of 8:1 to 10:1 expert to startup ratio appears to be the prevailing MDIA norm 
to date.  Interview with Patrick Riley, supra note 3. 
90. Research conducted for this Article found that an individual mentor averaged one 
to two hours per week.  Surveys by GAN find that active mentors give 3.3 hours per week.  
Interview with Patrick Riley, supra note 3. 
91. This estimate is based on average mentor participation across MDIAs. It assigns the 
value of mentor advising a rate of $300 per hour.  This number is conservative as it is consid-
erably lower than rates that VCs and CEOs would command as expert witnesses, consultants, 
or other roles.  Assumptions: eighty mentors actively involved in a cohort, fourteen-week 
program, each mentor averages three hours per week, $300 per hour.  With these assump-
tions, the value of volunteer contributions exceeds $1 million. 
92. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 168–70, 182. 
93. See id. at 146–48. 
94. Portfolio companies trust mentors introduced through the curated accelerator net-
work.  “When you meet someone through someone else, that relationship evolves faster 
than” if not.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #2, (Apr. 06, 2015) (notes 
on file with author). 
95. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 183–84. 
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widely known as a “pivot.”96  When a startup alters its business model, 
access to new information and connections is frequently required.  A 
critical mass of preassembled mentors with a range of capacities may 
include the new expertise needed by the startup, enabling a shift with-
out incurring the search costs of assembling a new roster of experts. 
Two, a technology-oriented startup faces the daunting task of track-
ing relevant technological and market changes with its limited re-
sources.97  Missing out on emerging tools risks missing out on cost sav-
ings and value creation that are shifting in exponential—not linear—
ways.98  Information is disaggregated across dispersed pockets and, 
from any single perspective, “information gaps” exist.99  Information ex-
change between a portfolio company and multiple mentors allows a 
startup to better mitigate information gaps by assembling information 
provided by multiple mentors. 
Three, pooling facilitates iterative exchanges among mentors.100  In-
teraction with more individuals facilitates emergent ideas where one 
idea builds upon another.101  This benefit can be facilitated when a port-
folio company hosts bi-weekly dinners so that its mentors interact and 
96. See id. at 185. 
97. See, e.g., W. Daniel Hillis, The Dawn of Entanglement, essay in 2010: How is the Internet 
Changing the Way You Think?, EDGE, http://edge.org/response-detail/10707 
[https://perma.cc/7GCJ-GYKJ] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 148 
n.38.
98. Complexity in interconnected technology systems is such that no one person or en-
tity can track all developments. For example, “The Entanglement” observes that technology 
is at once more interconnected yet less comprehensible.  See, e.g., Hillis, supra note 97; The
Coming Entanglement: Bill Joy and Danny Hillis, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: SCIENCE TALK (Feb. 15, 
2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/the-coming-entanglement-
bill-joy-an-12-02-15/ [https://perma.cc/992N-HFUN].  Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew 
McAffee highlight the difficulty most people have in grasping that technology is improving 
at an exponential—not linear—rate. This makes the speed of advances seem surprising.  For 
example, software increasingly handles unstructured tasks not predicted as recently as 2004, 
such as effectively driving cars.  ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFFEE, RACE AGAINST
THE MACHINE 19 (2011).  “This is the world we live in now.  It’s one where computers improve 
so quickly that their capabilities pass from the realm of science fiction into the everyday 
world not over the course of a human lifetime, or even within the span of a professional’s 
career, but instead in just a few years.” Id. at 14. 
99. Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017).
100. DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 44 (2006).
101. Emergence is “the creation of attributes, structures, and capabilities that are not 
inherent to any single node in the network.” Id.  Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAffee ob-
serve how complementary innovations expand the ability to “combine and recombine” ideas, 
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build on one another’s ideas.102  Along these lines, in 2016, Techstars 
Boulder began placing multiple mentors into the same meeting with 
startups at the outset of the program.  In this way, the addition of men-
tors who contribute to a portfolio company expand the “possible ways 
in which cooperating individuals can make each other creative in differ-
ent ways than they otherwise would have been.”103 Four, accelerators
also act as a buffer to protect startups against opportunism in their early 
outside interactions.104  One example of this is that most MDIAs prohibit 
mentors from taking a paid advisory role during a startup’s time in a 
program.105
2. Mentors self-select and help through three types of interactions 
An intense period where startups meet multiple mentors is common 
at the outset of an accelerator program.  The high frequency of meetings 
that a portfolio company takes early in the program is often cast in terms 
of psychological affliction (such as “mentor madness”106 and an “in-
sane”107 number of meetings) or mating metaphors (“speed dating” is 
common108).  Centralized commands that a mentor and a startup work 
together within a MDIA are atypical.  Instead MDIA experts and port-
which cascades and accelerates into combinatorial explosions.  BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFFEE,
supra note 98, at 20–21.  They point out that with fifty-two cards, there are 52! ways to arrange 
the cards.  This illustrates the “increasing returns to the scale of the pool of individuals, re-
sources, and projects to which they can be applied.”  Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, 
at 415.
102. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #7 (Apr. 9, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
103. Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 417; see also Shun-Ling Chen, Wikipedia: A 
Republic of Science Democratized, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH 247, 259 (2010).  (“[T]he whole com-
munity gradually enriches the protected software commons with everyone’s contributions.”). 
104. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 143–44, 165. 
105. Id. at 186–87. 
106. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #1 (Feb. 24, 
2015) (notes on file with author). 
107. Telephone interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #3 (Apr. 8, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
108. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #2, supra note 94; Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #7, supra note 102; Telephone Interview with 
Anonymous Mentor #9 (Apr. 15, 2015) (notes on file with author).  One CEO highlighted that 
“‘Would you be my mentor?’ . . . is kind of like asking someone out for a date.”  Similarly, 
“you can usually tell in the first couple minutes as to whether there is chemistry between 
people.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #5 (Apr. 8, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
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folio companies commonly choose one another.  An accelerator pro-
vides scaffolding early during a cohort’s cycle where mentors and port-
folio companies quickly meet in person and self-select into mentor / 
mentee relationships.109  Other activities, such as advising in portfolio 
company pitch practices, invite mentors to sign up on an as available 
basis.  Self-selection, which allows for maximum flexibility amid condi-
tions of high uncertainty, may provide more efficient organization of 
creative contributions than alternatives such as contracts or vertical firm 
integration.110
The frequency of meetings during the mentor matching phase is 
such that certain dimensions of company operations may be limited or 
even stalled.111  One managing director described the mentor matching 
phase “like digging for diamonds.  You have to move a lot of mud.  [It 
is] worth it when it works.”112  At an extreme, one accelerator had its 
109. Benjamin Hallen, Christopher Bingham, & Susan Cohen, Do Accelerators Acceler-
ate? The Role of Indirect Learning in New Venture Development 6 (July 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2719810 [https://perma.cc/S4VT-ZW3Y]. 
110. Governance structures organize how resources are allocated.  Structures send sig-
nals concerning the relative value of different “courses of action” that an agent may take to-
ward production.  Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 408.  Human creativity in infor-
mation production is difficult to standardize as an input for production. Id. at 414.  When the 
objective of a collaborative effort is to produce a creative output where a desired product or 
service does not yet exist, unique problems attend contracting.  James Bessen, Open Source 
Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 57, 61, 67 (Jurgen Bitzer & Philipp J.H. Schroder eds., 2006) (noting 
that when “innovation is ex ante indescribable” market-based contracting may be socially 
inefficient). Gilson et. al. observe that Knightian uncertainty makes it difficult to contract ef-
ficiently ex ante in transaction specific investments, a fact that makes flexibility in agreements 
important.  Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation, supra note 27, at 434, 451–52, 455. 
111. LUKE DEERING ET AL., ACCELERATE: FOUNDER INSIGHTS INTO ACCELERATOR
PROGRAMS 110 (2014) (near term “operations suffered” at startups during intensive mentor 
meetings at Springboard London program where each company had eighty meetings with 
mentors over two weeks).  A concern about accelerators is that “founders may waste time 
meeting with too many mentors and resolving conflicting feedback instead of working on 
their products.”  Sandy Yu, The Impact of Accelerators on High-Technology Ventures 2 (May 
2014) (unpublished thesis, New York University Stern School of Business) (on file with au-
thor).
112. Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #2 (Mar. 6, 2015) (notes on 
file with author).  Interestingly, early scholarship about accelerators suggests that portfolio 
company entrepreneurs with prior startup experience get significant value from accelerator 
participation.  Hallen et. al. found that accelerator companies with more experienced teams, 
when compared to similarly experienced teams with companies that did not participate in an 
accelerator, benefit from accelerator involvement.  Hallen et al., supra note 109, at 33. This 
may be because entrepreneurs with prior experience are able to more effectively identify 
worthwhile mentor advice.  Consistent with this, Y-Combinator anecdotally has “a number 
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startups begin with 110 mentor meetings during the program’s first 
thirty days.113  More common is a portfolio company conducting forty 
to eighty mentor meetings during the first month of a program.114  Man-
aging directors in less established accelerator programs supplement 
self-selection through more active matching of mentors and companies, 
perhaps because mentors are less motivated to proactively engage with-
out a prompt.115  Overall, the tripartite purpose of the high volume of 
early mentor meetings is to (i) help a company and mentors to identify 
promising collaboration through on-going relationships during the pro-
gram; (ii) orient a portfolio company to aspects of its business that re-
quire immediate attention;116 and (iii) teach entrepreneurs to communi-
cate effectively about their startup.117
Mentors provide the benefit of their expertise through three types of 
of returnees who wanted to go through YC again with a new startup idea.”  STROSS, supra
note 4, at 31–32. 
113. Telephone interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #3, supra note 107. 
114. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #1, su-
pra note 106.  Even at forty meetings, a participant described the initial experience as “pretty 
overwhelming.”  Concerns about whether time allocated to mentor meetings is worthwhile 
led one entrepreneur to conduct an experiment.  You “run the risk of 40 coffees / week and 
get nothing done.  So . . . I tested this.”  Using the digital assistant service Fancy Hands, the 
entrepreneur checked every meeting over past two months, and assigned a zero or one de-
pending on the answer to “did the meeting lead to progress for the company?”  The CEO 
found that 96% of meetings had in some way contributed to her company’s growth.  Tele-
phone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #10 (Apr. 13, 2015) (notes on file with au-
thor).
115. Telephone interview with Anonymous Mentor #7 (Apr. 15, 2015) (notes on file with 
author) (mentor in high reputation and new accelerator, comparing approaches); Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #11 (Mar. 25, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).  Some corporate accelerators augment self-selection by requiring a portfolio com-
pany to work with an assigned corporate mentor from the accelerator sponsor company.  En-
trepreneur #7 said that he felt arbitrarily forced to have “senior [company] mentor.” How-
ever, after being assigned a “very senior” individual, the company met the mentor every 
three weeks, “his advice was fantastic,” and the company maintained a relationship with the 
mentor post program.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #7, supra note 
102.
116. Mentor feedback early in a program is often exhausting and emotional for entre-
preneurs. Entrepreneur #1 noted that she was “crushed” “emotional” and “so unhappy those 
first few days.”  The harsh probing from mentors showed weaknesses that “take away eve-
rything you think you know.”  Over the course of the accelerator program, however, things 
improved.  “Now feeling like I’m being rebuilt . . . we have a new forecast. New partners. 
[We are] rebuilding everything about the business.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous 
Entrepreneur #1 (Apr. 6, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
117. One CEO highlighted the value of having to “explain [his company] in a 100 differ-
ent ways from a 100 different perspectives.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entre-
preneur #9 (Apr. 10, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
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interactions: (i) close engagement where lead mentors work directly 
with mentee startups, (ii) network extension where a mentor introduces 
a startup to an individual outside the accelerator network, and (iii) post-
accelerator involvement.118  Each is explained below. 
After mentors and startups self-select one another, portfolio compa-
nies are encouraged to identify a handful of “lead mentors” with whom 
they will regularly meet for the duration of the program.  Similarly, 
mentors are encouraged to select and work closely with a single com-
pany.  Mentors engage with startups to perform a wide variety of tasks.  
For example, mentors may help a team test its hypotheses about the 
startup’s prospects, validate company ideas, and “pivot” through stra-
tegic changes in direction.119  In addition, portfolio companies report 
that modeling—such as how mentors frame and approach problems—
is valuable in mentor interactions.120  Less common, mentors occasion-
ally execute concrete tasks on behalf of a company.121
A second type of startup / mentor interaction is network extension.  
Portfolio companies highlight the value of network extension whereby 
mentors introduce a startup to individuals who are outside the MDIA 
network.  One experienced entrepreneur said his initial mentors “were 
only one to two steps away from a mentor that I wanted to meet 
with.”122  That is, the initial mentors provided by the MDIA could make 
warm professional introductions to others outside the MDIA with on-
point expertise valued by the entrepreneur.  Further, portfolio compa-
nies in accelerators located in geographic areas that lack startup depth 
highlight that network extension is often the best way to acquire needed 
outside resources.123  Accelerator Representative #16 noted that his ac-
celerator asks startups “what mentors do you want to invite?  [This is] 
especially important in that [the MDIA’s] portfolio now has companies 
 118. See Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, supra note 1, at 165. 
119. Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneurs #1, 7, and 8.  Telephone Interview with 
Anonymous Entrepreneur #1 supra note 116; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entre-
preneur #7, supra note 102; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #8 (Apr. 9 
2015) (notes on file with author). 
120. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #5, supra note 17. 
121. One mentor helped a portfolio company hire people by doing diligence calls on 
prospective employees and, additionally, conducted a code review for another company.  Id.
122. Id.
123. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #6, (Apr. 9, 2015) (notes on 
file with author); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #10, supra note 114. 
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in sectors that we are not experts in.”124
Post accelerator involvement is the final phase of mentor – portfolio 
company interactions.  The three to four month accelerator program 
timeframe provides a natural expiration for mentor – portfolio company 
relationships.125  The end of a three to four month MDIA program is 
marked by a “Demo Day” where portfolio companies present their 
startup to a public audience.126  Many relationships go forward after the 
graduation-type Demo Day event.  Among portfolio companies inter-
viewed, each reported that at least one mentor relationship continued 
after the accelerator.127  Finally, interviews revealed that it is not unu-
sual, as one company phrased it, that the accelerator “turned us onto the 
idea” of mentors.128  In these instances, entrepreneurs indicated that 
learning to work with mentors becomes a habit that they take forward 
after the end of the accelerator program.129
3. Four types of experts participate in MDIAs 
Interviews identified four categories of MDIA mentors: experienced 
entrepreneurs, functional specialists, investors, and community mem-
bers.  A majority of mentors do not have formal ties to the MDIA, how-
ever, some mentors invest in the MDIA itself.130  Each type of mentor is 
described in the bullets below. 
•? Experienced entrepreneurs are the prized “athletes” of the 
124. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #16, supra note
66.
125. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #1, supra note 117. 
126. Id.
127. Sometimes post accelerator interaction is formalized.  GAN CEO Patrick Riley esti-
mates that less than 10% of active mentors directly invest in a mentee company.  Interview 
with Patrick Riley, supra note 3.  A mentor may join a mentee’s board of directors.  Portfolio 
company #7; Entrepreneur #1 (still in a program during the interview, planned to ask one to 
two mentors to join as Board member or Advisory Board member).  Telephone Interview 
with Anonymous Entrepreneur #1, supra note 116.  Others engage as advisory board mem-
bers. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #2, supra note 94.  Mentors occa-
sionally join a portfolio company in full time capacity.  Telephone Interview with Anony-
mous Mentor #9, supra note 108.  Many relationships simply go forward on an informal basis.  
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #5, supra note 108. 
128. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #2, supra note 94. 
129. Id.
130. Anecdotally, discussions with accelerator representatives suggest that a minority—
likely less than 10%—of mentors invest in the MDIA fund.  But reliable data across MDIAs is 
not currently available about the percentage of mentors who invest in MDIAs.  Interview 
with Patrick Riley, supra note 3. 
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MDIA mentor network.131  A serial entrepreneur is an indi-
vidual who has been involved in the early stages of multiple 
startups.  One managing director screens for entrepreneurs 
with at least two startup companies in their background.132
Experienced entrepreneurs are attractive to portfolio compa-
nies because of their tacit knowledge,133 reputational bene-
fits, and strategic expertise.  They also have bursts of time 
availability that benefit MDIAs.134
•? Functional specialists are individuals that possess expertise in 
a specific functional area important to companies such as fi-
nance, legal, technology, and marketing.135  Pre-seed startups 
rarely have the capacity to hire such specialists full-time, so 
functional specialist mentors provide outside assistance 
within their area of expertise. 
•? Investors bundle help to portfolio companies with the possi-
bility of a desirable future financial relationship.136  VCs and 
131. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #2, supra note
112.
132. Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #1, supra note 106. Most 
“coaches” that are compensated have leadership (i.e., C-level) experience in multiple emerg-
ing companies.  Accelerator #17, which has a select group of mentors that are given equity 
once they cross a certain level of accelerator involvement, looks for mentors that have (i) built 
business valued at $100 million or more, and (ii) received positive mentoring feedback from 
portfolio companies.  Likewise, Accelerator #20’s “lead mentors” are business executives that 
worked for Fortune 500 companies or have built and sold venture backed companies.  While 
Accelerator #20’s lead mentors are not directly compensated, about one-third invest in the 
accelerator and therefore receive compensation on “the back-end.”  Telephone Interview by 
Malea McKeown with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #18 (June 2, 2016) (notes on 
file with author); E-mail from Anonymous Accelerator Representative #20, to Malea McKe-
own (June 23, 2016, 09:26 MST) (on file with author). 
133. “‘Tacit knowledge’ is the skill or expertise, as opposed to easily codifiable infor-
mation, that employees acquire through experience.”  See Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastruc-
ture of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Com-
pete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577 n.10 (1999). 
134. MDIAs report that entrepreneurs in between jobs sometimes spend tens of hours 
per week working with portfolio companies.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor 
#9, supra note 108.  When in between companies, such as after an exit or wind down, an 
entrepreneur may have extended time availability that permits spending one day per week 
or more with the accelerator.  Id.
135. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #1, supra note
106 (looks for individuals who were “CFO, CTO or growth hackers”); Telephone Interview 
with Anonymous Mentor #17 (Sept. 17, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
136. Anticipation of future interaction sometimes complicates interactions. A company 
may posture for future investment.  An investor mentor may also advise with this possibility 
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angels are commonly mentors within MDIAs.137  Corporate 
accelerators also include “prospective partner” mentors who 
could help create business opportunities with incumbent 
companies.138  Like an investor, prospective partners present 
a source of possible future financial help.139
•? Community members are a fourth and smaller mentor cate-
gory.  This includes well-connected individuals and/or aca-
demics.  Such individuals are often valuable for their ability 
to connect portfolio companies to resources in geographic ar-
eas beyond the mentor network.
III. A MDIA CREATES A GENERALIZED EXCHANGE SYSTEM WHERE
INDIRECT BENEFITS AND A MUTUAL OPTION SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
CONSIDERATION
Why and how does mentor volunteerism coexist alongside the profit 
motives of a MDIA and its portfolio companies?  Subsection A explains 
that legal scholarship does not provide a satisfying answer.  Subsection 
B then sets forth the Article’s main thesis—viz., a successful MDIA bro-
kers indirect yet economically significant trades between participants in 
a generalized exchange system.  The viability of a MDIA’s strategy to 
attract high caliber mentors hinges on whether the promise of indirect 
benefits, unknown ex ante to a mentor, combined with volunteerism mo-
tivations and a mutual option for post accelerator engagement, are at-
tractive enough to substitute for legal consideration and induce mentor 
participation.140
in mind.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entrepreneur #8, supra note 79. 
137. Roles blend together.  For example, experienced entrepreneurs and functional spe-
cialists also have the option—and are in fact encouraged—to also be an investor in the MDIA 
as well as portfolio companies. 
138. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #13 (Apr. 29, 
2015) (notes on file with author). 
139. A larger company may “partner” with a portfolio company in a deal after an accel-
erator program concludes.  In mentor/prospective partner interactions, a portfolio company 
is often “pitching them as a possible partner.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Entre-
preneur #8, supra note 119 (describing corporate accelerators).  Accelerator Representative 
#13 reported that eight out of ten portfolio companies in a cohort entered into a business 
relationship agreement with the corporate sponsor after the accelerator ended.  Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #13 (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).
140. Volunteerism motivation is further discussed in Section V.B of this Article.
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A. Legal Scholarship Does Not Resolve the Mentor Conundrum 
At least three legal scholarship threads bear upon but fail to resolve 
the mentorship conundrum.  One, scholars examine conditions—like 
MDIAs—where high uncertainty and information asymmetry present 
challenges to commercial relationships.141  Two, “order without law” 
studies community norms that govern behavior in lieu of formal legal 
tools.142  Three, peer production examines large scale digital projects 
that aggregate fragmented volunteer contributions.  Each is considered 
in turn. 
Mentor / startup relationships exist in uncertain environments at-
tended by asymmetric information between parties.  Uncertainty is high 
because much is unknown about an early stage startup.143  To the extent 
information is knowable, entrepreneurs possess far more information 
than individuals outside the startup about their startup’s capabilities, 
operations, and competitive landscape.144  Uncertainty and information 
asymmetry create unique organizational challenges for collaboration. 
Incomplete contracts literature theorizes why uncertain conditions 
lead parties to risk ex post contractual disputes in order to save on ex ante 
contracting costs.145  Braiding literature documents procedural frame-
works used to build trust even as particulars of yet-unknown innova-
tions are left underspecified.146  But incomplete contracts and braiding 
study formal arrangements that specify a benefit—i.e., consideration— 
141.  See, e.g., Darian Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2012)
at 4. On issues of uncertainty in entrepreneurship, see FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY,
AND PROFIT 231 (1921). 
142. Robert Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whal-
ing Industry, 5 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 83, 83–84 (1989).  See Bernstein, supra note 21, at 157; 
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 21, at 627; Hadfield, supra note 21, at 8; Macaulay, 
supra note 21, at 55. 
143. KNIGHT, supra note 140, at 231 (defining uncertainty as instances in which “an ob-
jectively measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable”).  Gompers & Lerner de-
fine uncertainty as “a measure of the array of potential outcomes for a company or project.”  
PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 6–7, 157 (2004). 
144. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1405, 1412 (2008) (many unknowns of a startup’s early stages “provides entrepreneurs 
with significant informational advantages over venture capitalists and increases agency costs 
by making it more difficult for venture capitalists to sort between good and bad entrepre-
neurs”).
145. Parties willing to trade lower front end transactional costs for higher potential back 
end enforcement costs enter into incomplete contracts.  See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, Incomplete 
Contracts, supra note 25, at 190–91. 
146. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 25, at 1383–84. 
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that induces a party’s participation.147  Neither incomplete contracts nor 
braiding explains why an expert participates in a MDIA without the in-
ducement of direct consideration.148
Preliminary agreements, like mentor / startup MDIA relationships, 
do not involve formal contracts.  Examinations of preliminary agree-
ments analyze instances where parties “have discussed a deal” but post-
pone formal contracting until asymmetric information is reduced and 
uncertainties are resolved.149  An important difference between prelim-
inary contracts and mentor startup relationships, however, concerns the 
structure of exchange.  Preliminary contracts, as with incomplete con-
tracts and braiding, primarily contemplate two-party exchanges.  But a 
mentor does not anticipate a two-party exchange with proportional ben-
efits.150  Instead, a MDIA mentor unilaterally helps a portfolio company 
that is not expected to directly reciprocate.151
Norm-based “order without law” studies behaviors, like mentor ac-
tivities, that are not governed by legal tools.  “Order without law” in-
vestigates how social norms direct behaviors in tight knit communities, 
147. Id.
148. Free riding is the flip side of this coin.  When resources are freely available, a party 
may take benefits without a return contribution.  Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1105 (“[T]he 
existence of a generalized exchange is a puzzle because any member of the exchange system 
can free ride.  There is no guarantee of reciprocity.”)  Formal contracts mitigate free rider 
problems by prescribing obligations to be borne in exchange for receiving a benefit. 
149. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreement,
120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664–66 (2007) (preliminary agreements are commonly “exploratory . . . 
[as] a necessary condition for parties to pursue an efficient project later”). Preliminary con-
tracts organize a relationship so that, if a deal makes sense once uncertainty is resolved, a 
participant receives direct consideration. Id. at 662–63. (“[I}f the transaction turns out to be 
profitable after uncertainty is resolved, the parties will make their agreement more concrete 
and then conduct the transaction.  But if the transaction turns out to be unprofitable, the par-
ties will abandon the project.”). 
150.  As we will return to below, relational contract theory considers relevant social fac-
tors outside of a formal agreement. A relational contract is not viewed seen as “an independ-
ent system” but rather as “integral parts of a much larger system” with “countless other 
goals.” Macneil, supra note 37, at 888. Relational contracts are further discussed in Part III of 
this Article.
151. As explained in Part IV, a mentor expects to realize benefits from others in a net-
work. 
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such as Nineteenth Century whalers,152 Twentieth Century cattle ranch-
ers,153 and modern day diamond traders.154  This line of literature fo-
cuses primarily on de facto property rights and net economic effi-
ciency.155  “Order without law” has less to say, however, about a party’s 
motivation to volunteer outside contexts of reciprocal consideration.156
Finally, legal scholarship on peer production organization bears re-
semblance to MDIA mentor activity.  Peer production, used to create 
collective digital projects such as Wikipedia, Bitcoin, and open source 
software, involves “production systems that depend on individual ac-
tion that is self-selected and decentralized, rather than hierarchically as-
signed.”157  Peer production describes collaborative efforts where a mass 
of individuals voluntarily contributes to create a good or service.158
MDIAs co-opt four prominent peer production organizational strate-
gies: (i) a group of individuals contributes to a project; (ii) important 
mentor contributions are voluntary; (iii) expert participants self-select 
where and how to contribute; and (iv) fragmented information-based 
contributions are aggregated.159
But peer production, as described in legal scholarship, differs in two 
important ways from mentor / portfolio company interactions.160  First, 
152. Robert Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whal-
ing Industry, 5 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989). 
153. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 21, at 624.
154. Bernstein, supra note 21, at 115. 
155. See Ellickson, supra note 153, at 84 (1989) (“when people are situated in a close-knit 
group, they will tend to develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth-
maximizing”).  “A norm is ‘wealth-maximizing’ when it operates to minimize the members’ 
objective sum of (1) transaction costs, and (2) deadweight losses arising from failure to exploit 
potential gains from trade.” Id.
156. In particular, order without law accounts fail to describe how benefits induce col-
laborator participation in instances where a beneficiary is not obligated to directly reciprocate 
a benefactor. 
157. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 62 (2006). 
158. See id.
159. Scholars who examine peer production, such as Yochai Benkler, describe how cer-
tain volunteers ultimately reap economic benefits.  For example, a company may volunteer 
to create and improve open source software, but in turn make money be selling services re-
lated to the software.  This is further discussed as Indirect External Benefits, in Section IV.B. 
160. Legal scholars observe peer production across several digital domains, including 
production of complex software and operating systems (e.g., GNU / Linux, Apache, and An-
droid), creation and assembly of content for digital repositories (e.g., Wikipedia, Slashdot, 
and legal Wikis), and other digital realms where the decentralized production of the crowd 
is leveraged through technology (e.g., mapping Mars craters, production of multi-player 
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legal scholars seldom consider peer production projects that occur 
within a for-profit setting.  This is significant because volunteer behav-
ior often wanes where contributors become aware that private actors 
capture outsized commercial gains from their free contributions.161  Un-
like peer production in a non-profit setting, mentors assist creation of 
goods and services from which a portfolio company and MDIA owners 
will directly profit, giving rise to a “sucker’s award” problem.162  Se-
cond, digital peer production goods often produce goods that are open 
to the public, as opposed to goods that are proprietary to a for-profit 
company. 163  Unlike with a collectively created public good, accelerator 
mentors help produce a club good where startups may exclude public 
access to its product or service.164
games).  Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 408, 439–43; Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, supra
note 41, at 976–77; George Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and 
Innovation In Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 203 (2013); Chen, supra note 103, 
at 259 (The Free Software Movement “showed that pecuniary incentive may not be indispen-
sable to the development of high-quality software . . . .”). 
161. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 440 (noting that volunteer AOL dis-
cussion moderators quit when they realized that the company was making money from their 
efforts; however, also noting counterexample of free software where some “contributors have 
made billions, while some of the leaders of major projects have earned nothing but honor”).  
Along these lines, some large-scale peer production has proven sustainable in digital collec-
tive endeavors.  User generated content, such as customer reviews on Amazon, Yelp, and 
Trip Advisor, are a form of volunteerism that benefits companies in for-profit commercial 
settings.  Other studies document economically significant innovation generated by individ-
uals who do not fully capture wealth created by the innovation. See generally VON HIPPEL,
supra note 38 (documenting and explaining user based innovation); Powell, supra note 6, at 
322.
162. Where an individual creates a good owned by others, the individual event faces the 
“sucker’s award” of having to pay for the good at a later time. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin,
supra note 41, at 440.  Benkler discusses an academic permutation of this problem where con-
tributors are barred from using the end product they helped create, such as academics’ free 
contribution to journals’ content, whose institutions must then buy back the journals. Id. at
441.
163. A fundamental difference between a MDIA and digital peer production concerns 
the private vs. public benefits of what is produced.  In particular, the free contributions of 
MDIA experts benefit for-profit companies that may limit public access to their products, a 
significant departure from the publicly accessible character of peer produced goods.  To the 
extent that restrictions are placed upon a peer produced good, in contrast, the restriction aims 
to ensure that public benefit is safeguarded for the future. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra
note 41, at 440–41 (puzzling over circumstances where contributors are barred from using the 
end product they helped create, such as academics’ free contribution to journals’ content, 
whose institutions must then buy back the journals). 
164. In an accelerator, information production yields a club good that has non-rival 
characteristics, even where exclusion is possible.  Patrick McNutt, Public Goods and Club 
Goods, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF 
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B. MDIAs Sweep Entrepreneurial Interactions Into a System of Generalized 
Exchange
In 1963, Stewart Macaulay published his classic study of Wisconsin 
businesspeople in the American Sociological Review.165  Sociological 
tools are foundational to the field of relational contracts.166  Relational 
contract scholars highlight that exchanges occur in a social context.167
Certain transactions are more relational than others.  The purchase of 
gas for a car, for example, is a relatively “discrete” transaction—that is, 
relational elements are minimal.168  Other transactions, more sensitive 
to social context, are highly relational.  Empirical support for the theo-
retical propositions of relational scholars is now found in a stream of 
social science research that underscores how “relational contract behav-
iors are economic contract behaviors.”169
Legal scholarship has largely ignored another branch of sociology 
research relevant to understanding collaboration: generalized ex-
change.170  Sociologists broadly identify two types of systems that struc-
ture exchanges: direct (i.e., bilateral) and generalized.171  Studies empha-
size the importance of exchange structure.  In particular, empirical 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 927 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). The ability to 
exclude underscores an important distinction between production of a good versus access to a 
good.  Jonathan Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1751, 1753 (2010).
Other differences exist between MDIAs and digital peer production as well.  Notably, there 
is a sizable numeric difference between volunteers in digital peer production and MDIA vol-
unteers.  “Peer production relies on making an unbounded set of resources available to an 
unbounded set of agents, who can apply themselves toward and unbounded set of projects.”  
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 41, at 415.  In contrast, MDIA mentor networks are dra-
matically smaller than the seeming “unbounded” critical mass—often numbering tens of 
thousands or more contributors—attracted to popular digital production projects.  A reason 
for disparity in numbers is that MDIAs have higher barriers to participation than digital peer 
production projects.  MDIAs are not open to just anyone, only to MDIA invitees. 
165. Macaulay, supra note 21, at 55. 
166. Cimino, supra note 32, at 96 (relational contract theory “is not grounded in law at 
all.  Instead it is an interdisciplinary theory grounded in sociology”). 
167. See Ian Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 344 
(1983).
168. But not irrelevant.  See id. at 344 (discussing relational elements in purchase of gas-
oline).
169. Cimino, supra note 32, at 95 (discussing business social science research and empir-
ical evidence showing that “relational norms and social context have instrumental, quantifi-
able effects on exchange”). 
170. But see Healy & Krawiec, supra note 40. 
171. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121–22 (“Unlike generalized exchange, direct ex-
change refers to the transfer of resources within a dyad.  Researchers have identified two 
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research shows that structure strongly affects (i) socio-economic moti-
vation of actors; (ii) how participants view the source of value provided 
from collaboration,172 and (iii) the character of collaboration’s outputs.173
Direct exchange—viz., I give you this, you give me that – is well known 
within legal scholarship.  In direct exchanges “two actors exchange re-
sources with each other.”174  In contrast, “[g]eneralized exchange refers 
to the indirect giving and receiving of benefits among three or more 
people who belong to the same group, organization, or network.”175
Generalized exchange has much to say about how MDIA systems—and, 
potentially, how other parts of the entrepreneurial community are orga-
nized.  Figure 2 highlights the differences between direct and general-
ized exchange. 
distinct structures of direct exchange: negotiated and reciprocal. In negotiated exchange, the 
transfer of resources between actors is simultaneous.  In reciprocal exchange, some delay 
occurs between unilateral transfers of resources between members of a dyad, thereby requir-
ing direct reciprocity.  Examples of direct exchanges are more typical than examples of gen-
eralized exchange, including purchasing an item, trading goods, turn-taking, and various 
forms of dyadic favor-trading.”). See also Healy & Krawiec, supra note 33, at 646 (describing 
the “division between two modes of exchange: a customary type rooted in reciprocity and a 
formal type built on contract”). 
172. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 120 (“Benefits received through generalized exchange 
have a stronger impact on individuals’ views of and feelings toward the group than direct 
exchange in which individuals or dyads are more likely to be seen as the source of benefits.”). 
173. See, e.g., TERESA AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT (1996); Edward L. Deci et al., A
Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Mo-
tivation, 125 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 627, 627–28 (1999). 
174. Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1106. 
175. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121. See also Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1106 (explain-
ing that social exchange theory’s roots are in sociology, psychology and anthropology); Linda 
D. Molm et al., Building Solidarity through Generalized Exchange, 113 AM. J. SOC. 205, 207 (2007) 
(“All forms of social exchange occur within structures of mutual dependence, that is, struc-
tures in which actors are mutually, or reciprocally, dependent on one another for valued out-
comes.”).
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Figure 2: Direct exchange versus generalized exchange 
 
In its pure form, generalized exchange stands in contradistinction to 
a direct exchange.176  The left side of Figure 2 shows a straightforward 
direct exchange: collaborator 1 gives to collaborator 2; collaborator 2 
gives directly back to collaborator 1.  The bilateral trade could be spelled 
out in a formal agreement (i.e., “negotiated”) or could be left to informal 
mechanisms (i.e., “reciprocated”).177  In contrast, as shown on the right 
of Figure 2, generalized exchange has two notable characteristics: (1) 
unilateral giving, and (2) indirect return of benefits.178  Unilateral giving 
is observed where a contributor does not expect consideration in return 
from the group member who directly benefits from the contributor’s 
help.  In Figure 2, at time 1 (T1), collaborator 1 provides help to collab-
orator 2.  Unlike in direct exchange, collaborator 2 is not obligated to 
 
176. Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1106.
177. Molm et. al., supra note 176, at 207–08 (describing two forms of direct exchange: 
negotiated and reciprocated).  Negotiated exchange involves up front determination concern-
ing the details of an agreement. Id.  Reciprocated exchange leaves the terms of an agreement 
open, however, it is expected that the benefit will be directly returned by the beneficiary. Id. 
178. Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1105–06. 
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directly return commensurate value to collaborator 1.  Rather, collabo-
rator 1 trusts that benefits will return indirectly from another collabora-
tor in the system.  In Figure 2, the benefit arrives at time 3 (T3) from 
collaborator 3.  In this way, a generalized giving system is not oriented 
around bilateral reciprocity.  Instead, a generalized giving system is 
“characterized by unilateral resource giving because one’s giving is not 
reciprocated by the recipient, but by a third party.”179  Sociologists over 
the last decade have observed generalized exchange within digital peer 
production environments as well as networks that blend digital and an-
alog features.180
Participation in a generalized exchange system is riskier than direct 
exchange with respect to compensation.181  Generalized exchange, un-
like a guarantee secured through a formal contract, lacks the promise of 
direct consideration.  Trust and risk attend generalized exchange since 
a participant seldom knows exactly when, or in what form, or from 
whom a benefit will return (or even if a benefit will accrue).182  If a par-
ticipant in a generalized exchange system does not receive a benefit, 
there is little recourse (i.e., she cannot sue for breach of contract).  More 
fundamentally, generalized exchange involves the structure of a social 
dilemma.183  In the absence of a legal obligation that binds a participant’s 
contribution, generalized exchange invites individuals to take benefits 
179. Id. at 1105. 
180. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121 (“Everyday examples of generalized exchange in 
modern organizations are common and often spontaneously emerge, including online file 
sharing, open-source software programming, peer-to-peer mentoring, and so on.”).  Kollock 
observes that an interesting feature of internet-based peer production, where the “setting is 
one of bits rather than atoms” is that those who enjoy the fruits of the project are often un-
known and anonymous, at least from the perspective of peer production contributors.  Such 
contributions are more to “group as a whole.”  Kollock, supra note 31, at 223, 228. 
181. Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1107. 
182. Id. (“[F]orming a generalized exchange system is very risky because unilateral re-
source giving is an invitation to exploitation (e.g., Bearman 1997; Gillmore 1987; Yamagishi 
& Cook 1993). This feature of generalized exchange coincides with the problem that is prev-
alent in another research area: the free rider problem of social dilemmas.”).  A generalized 
exchange “system of sharing is both more generous and riskier than traditional gift ex-
change.”  Kollock, supra note 31, at 233.  When generalized exchange participants realize ben-
efits, then the participant has greater feelings of solidarity and group identification than with 
a direct exchange system.  In this way, the structure of exchange affects how participants feel 
about the network.  The significance of this is elaborated upon in Part V of this Article.
183. Generalized exchange “has the structure of a social dilemma—individually reasona-
ble behavior (gathering but not offering information) leads to collective disaster.”  Kollock, 
supra note 31, at 222.  Contracts resolve a social dilemma by promising a benefit—i.e., consid-
eration—to prompt a party’s participation. 
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from a MDIA without making adequate contributions to the system.184
MDIA mentors are said to be “willing to help without expecting an-
ything in return.”185  This norm of mentorship does not reflect pure al-
truism, rather, it highlights that mentors participate in generalized ex-
change where “benefits are indirectly repaid.”186  Mentor #8, an 
investor, observed that it “takes a lot of convincing for people who are 
not used to it,” but the accelerator system is “not [one of] reciprocity.”187
Language portending deserved good fortune back to a contributor, such 
as a “business karmic loop,” is used to describe rewards for a mentor’s 
MDIA participation the absence of a specified return.188  Yet viewing the 
MDIA as a generalized giving system shows that, far from luck, mentors 
participate in a system where economic benefits redound, even if the 
exact form of benefit is uncertain at the time of a contribution. 
Direct exchange obligations within a MDIA are not prescribed ex
ante between a mentor and a portfolio company.  Indeed a mentee port-
folio company is not obligated to return benefits to a mentor.  But nei-
ther does a MDIA foreclose instrumental benefits associated with direct 
mentor / mentee interactions.  In this respect, the accelerator is not a 
184. Accountability mechanisms, such as making participants’ conduct visible to others, 
may mitigate some free rider problems.  Accountability measures encourage desirable con-
tributions and discipline unwanted conduct. Kollock, supra note 31 at 233.  The social di-
lemma involved in MDIAs echoes of “team production” problems in venture capital explored 
by Gordon Smith.  In particular, Smith examines the “incentive to shirk” in connection with 
startup activities, stemming from the “inability to monitor team members perfectly and com-
pensate them based on productivity.” D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital 
Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 961 (1999). 
185. Observations of Isaac Saldana, Tim Jenkins, and Jose Lopez, Founders of SendGrid, 
in LUKE DEERING, ACCELERATE: FOUNDER INSIGHTS INTO ACCELERATOR PROGRAMS 111
(2014).
186. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121. 
187. Mentor #8, a professional investor, provided an example of how actors that insist 
upon direct reciprocity get left out of the accelerator system.  Mentor #8 said he worked with 
an accounting firm for many years.  He helped an accelerator portfolio company that had an 
accounting-related application.  The startup needed introductions to other accountants.  Men-
tor #8 asked for help on the startup’s behalf.  Mentor #8’s accounting firm responded, “who 
is their accountant?” – implying that the firm would help the startup if the startup recipro-
cated by engaging the accountant firm.  Unhappy with this tit for tat approach, Mentor #8 
immediately moved onto a new accounting firm. If “[the firm] said ‘of course’ . . . then I 
would still be with them, and they’d also have a new client.  Instead I moved on to a new 
firm.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79. 
188. Interviewees invoke the word “karma” to describe the uncertain way an accelerator 
system works.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79; Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Mentor #7, supra note 102 (“business karmic loop has paid off 
for me”); PC #10. 
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pure system of generalized exchange.189  Bilateral relations between a 
mentor and a mentee during an accelerator program take on the charac-
ter of an implied mutual option.190  The duration of the accelerator pro-
gram acts as a probationary period.  After the conclusion of a MDIA 
program, the mutual option may be jointly exercised by a mentor and 
mentee with respect to at least three types of relationships: (i) invest-
ment by a mentor  into a mentee portfolio company;191 (ii) a full-time job 
opportunity for a mentor with a mentee portfolio company;192 and (iii) 
formal advising roles for a mentor with a portfolio company, such as 
Board of Director or Advisory Board member.193  The socially integrated 
governance structure of accelerators, in sum, situates mentor / mentee 
interactions amid generalized exchange while preserving a mutual op-
tion that mentors and mentees may exercise in the future. 
Figure 3 situates economic transactions along two axes: social im-
portance and structure of exchange. 
189. Mixed environments are common in the real world.  Healy & Krawiec, supra note 
33; see also Kollock, supra note 31 (discussing mixed gift and commodity economic elements 
of blood donations).  Contrast the accelerator’s mixed exchange with the Freecycle system, as 
described by Willer et. al. Freecycle has a “strict requirement” against a quid pro quo arrange-
ment of exchange.  See Willer et al., supra note 11, at 121. 
190. An option is a contract where a party may elect a future relationship.  A mutual 
option exists where both parties may elect a future relationship. 
191. This is reflected in Mentor #8’s comment that “I don’t expect anything from com-
panies that I’m mentoring other than opportunity to invest.”  Telephone Interview with Anon-
ymous Mentor #8, supra note 79 (emphasis added).
192. Serial entrepreneur Tim Enwall, for example, mentored Revolv in the 2014 
Techstars class.  After the program, Enwall assumed a CEO role with the company. 
193. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79. 
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Figure 3: Social importance and the structure of exchange 
Relational aspects of a transaction may be of low importance (i.e., 
“discrete” transactions).  Purchasing tickets on Craig’s List as well as the 
purchase of gasoline from a convenience store are examples of discrete 
transactions.194  Relational dimensions are central to a transaction on the 
other end of the spectrum.  Long term relationships with close working 
partners, such as those described by Bernstein between original equip-
ment manufacturers and suppliers in the Midwest, are highly relational 
transactional environments.195
The other axis of Figure 3 highlights the structural spectrum of ex-
change, ranging from direct to generalized.  As depicted in the upper 
194. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 140–44. 
195. See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance 
in Procurement Contracts 2 (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econs., Working 
Paper No. 742, 2016), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=2425&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/CME3-NW4M]. 
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left quadrant, a braided agreement that structures innovation efforts be-
tween a large pharmaceutical company and a biotechnology startup, as 
detailed by Gilson et. al., occurs within a highly relational and direct ex-
change environment.196  As depicted in the lower right quadrant, gener-
alized exchange may also be relatively discrete, such as a contribution 
of a volunteer who serves in relative anonymity helping analyze photos 
of the Mars mapping project, or a bicycle given away by a member of 
Free Cycle in the absence of a personal relationship.197
Figure 4: MDIA impact on the structure of entrepreneurial ex-
change
Investigation shows that MDIAs push entrepreneurial collaboration 
into environments that are more relational and have the structure of 
196. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 25, at 1405. 
197. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 140–44. 
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generalized exchange.  Figure 4 shows how MDIAs move two types of 
exchanges into the upper right quadrant (highly relational and general-
ized).  First, consider an advisory board relationship between an expe-
rienced entrepreneur and a startup. This exchange is highly relational 
and direct in the absence of a MDIA.  An expert advisory board member 
would trade advice, often on a prescribed time frame and cadence of 
interaction, in exchange for company equity.198  MDIAs move this type 
of substantive collaboration into a generalized exchange structure.  Sub-
stantive collaboration between the expert and portfolio company is 
functionally similar within the MDIA as it is outside of it, however, no 
terms of direct reciprocity are specified in the MDIA setting.199  Second, 
consider an instance in which an expert is willing to conduct an ad hoc, 
one time meeting over coffee with a startup.  This one-off exchange is 
discrete yet part of a startup scene’s generalized system.  On the rela-
tional scale, it is discrete because the meeting is a one-off information 
exchange where relational aspects are not nurtured.  On the structural 
scale, it is generalized insofar as an expert gives into a community pool 
of goodwill without securing a direct return benefit.  MDIAs heighten 
the relational dimension of this transaction by introducing a mechanism 
for repeat and regular interactions between the expert and the portfolio 
company that extend beyond a single coffee discussion.  Moreover, the 
MDIA makes the contribution of the expert to the portfolio company 
more visible to others, which also expands relational aspects of involve-
ment to a wider group of people. 
Generalized exchange best resolves the mentorship conundrum.  
This body of literature also holds promise for other legal scholarly in-
vestigations.  For example, sociologists consider ways in which peer 
production, which Benkler and others have examined, works as a type 
of generalized exchange.200  Further, recent scholarship about “negative 
legal spaces” analyze commercial environments, such as fashion and 
magician communities, that minimize use of available legal tools.201
198. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 186 n.260. 
199. See id. at 186. 
200. See, e.g., Willer, et al., supra note 11, at 121 (“Everyday examples of generalized ex-
change in modern organizations are common and often spontaneously emerge, including 
online file sharing, open-source software programming, peer-to-peer mentoring, and so 
on.”).  Kollock also consider peer production activity.  Peter Kollock & Marc A. Smith, Com-
munities in Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 3–4 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock 
eds., 1999). 
201. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 24, at 1762–64; Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: 
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Generalized exchange may enhance insight into how multilateral bene-
fits circulate in these communities.  Finally, legal scholars such as Lynn 
Stout question assumptions that actors in commercial contexts are self-
ish and rational.202  Such assumptions led to inaccurate predictions 
about behavior that Stout observed in corporations.203  Generalized ex-
change tools may be useful in furthering analyses such as pro-social be-
havior in corporate settings and solutions to team production dilem-
mas.204
IV.  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INDIRECT BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE TO 
MDIA MENTORS
MDIA collaborations between mentors and mentees occur primarily 
within a generalized exchange environment.205  A mentor enjoys feel-
ings of volunteerism in the absence of guaranteed compensation.206  Yet, 
How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law 1 (2007) (working draft), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1005564 [https://perma.cc/NZ3U-G6UQ];
Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 318–19; John Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 
HASTINGS COMMC’NS AND ENTM’T L.J. 203, 213–14 (2008).  A “negative legal space” describes 
an industry sector or a community of practice where parties largely forego legal mechanisms, 
such as intellectual property protections or contracts to protect human capital, in order to 
promote information sharing and new idea creation.  See Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 318–19.  
Relatedly, Orly Lobel chronicles how experts and new companies interact in a variety of con-
texts that eschew formal intellectual property protection measures, bypass human capital 
controls, and minimize formal contracts. See LOBEL, supra note 24, at 7. 
202. Stout critiques conventional economic wisdom that most “people act like members 
of the species homo economicus: they act selfishly and rationally.  ‘Economic Man’ does not 
worry about morality, ethics, or other people.  He worries only about himself, calculatingly 
and opportunistically pursuing the course of action that brings him the greatest material ad-
vantage.” STOUT, supra note 39, at 4. 
203. Id. at 8. 
204. For an overview of organizational behavior literature about pro-social behavior, see
GRANT, supra note 39 (explaining why generous individuals who use “other’ish” strategies 
perform better than selfish actors in corporate contexts).  Team production refers to contexts, 
such as cooperation between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, in which: “(1) several 
types of resources are used; (2) the product is not the sum of separate outputs of each coop-
erating resource; and (3) not all resources used in team production belong to one person.” 
Smith, supra note 183, at 950 n.5 (distilling definition of Alchian and Demsetz).  Collaborative 
aspects of team production give rise to moral hazard and shirking problems. Id.
205. Mentors and mentees have a mutual option for direct exchange that may be exer-
cised at a later time.  See supra Sections III.A, III.B. 
206. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 67, 77–102 (2010) (summarizing behav-
ioral economics research that explains why “we are happy to do things, but not when we are 
paid to do them”).  Ariely argues there is a crucial distinction between a world of “social 
exchanges” versus a world of “market exchanges.”  Id. at 84–85.  Payment moves an activity 
out of the domain of social exchange and into the market domain.  This is consistent with 
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a mentor realizes two kinds of economic rewards: (i) internal indirect 
benefits—i.e., gains from others within the MDIA network; and (ii) ex-
ternal indirect benefits—i.e., gains from third parties outside of the 
MDIA network. Each is described in turn. 
A. Four categories of internal indirect benefits are visible within MDIAs 
The range of participants in a MDIA composition creates a variety 
of possible ways to reward a participant’s unilateral contribution.207  In-
terviews with members of an accelerator’s exchange system show how 
internal indirect benefits (“IIBs”) circulate.  Four categories of economi-
cally significant IIBs are observed within a MDIA: (i) learning, (ii) social 
capital, (iii) entrepreneurial finance, and (iv) job prospects.
Learning benefits are one type of IIB.208 MDIA participation enables 
pattern recognition associated with exposure to multiple companies.  
The opportunity to see ten (or so) new companies within a MDIA cohort 
exposes a mentor to non-public information, including multiple new 
business ideas, emerging technologies, and investor trends.209  Experts 
value non-public information that they can use to identify under-valued 
opportunities and exploit asymmetric information environments.210
empirical work in psychology which suggests that tangible direct rewards adversely affects 
intrinsic motivation for otherwise interesting tasks.  Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 653 (1999). Deci et al., supra note 174, at 653 (analyzing data over 128 
studies).
207. Id.
208. Scholars document the economic value of learning available to individuals and 
companies through monitoring and active engagement.  For example, banks compete at be-
low market prices for the business of new clients because of the information advantages that 
flow from such relationships and prove valuable over time.  Steven A. Sharpe, Asymmetric 
information, bank lending and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships, J.
FINANCE 45, 1069–87 (1990); see also Brian Broughman and Jesse Fried, Do VCs use inside 
rounds to dilute founders? Some evidence from Silicon Valley, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1104, 1105 (2012) 
(discussing asymmetric advantages associated with informational lock-in).  On learning and 
monitoring broadly, see generally Charles Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Eco-
nomic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 37–65 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Richard Swedberg eds., 1st ed. 1994). 
209. As a mentor in accelerators told me, “I’m not looking for my mentees to add value 
back to me (although they sometimes do).  I expect that the value of networking with other 
mentors, access to a ‘first look’ at a range of ideas and the additional credibility on my 
LinkedIn profile will be the compensation I receive for my contributions.”  Email from Peter 
Bell to author (July 14, 2016, 06:44 PM) (on file with author). 
210. See Sharpe, supra note 177; see also JOSH LERNER, YALE UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS
OFFICE: JUNE 2003 4 (2003) (discussing information gaps in private markets that may be prof-
itably exploited by experts). 
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Some aspects of MDIA learning are reciprocal insofar as a mentor gets 
insight by working directly with a mentee portfolio company.  But other 
significant learning benefits are indirect and flow from peripheral inter-
actions with other companies as well as other mentors in the system.211
Mentor #1 highlighted the learning value associated with hearing other 
mentors comment on a portfolio company.212  Similarly, Mentor #10 
highlighted the value of exposure to “cutting edge things and smart 
people.”213  MDIA mentors gain insight about emerging tools, tech-
niques, and industry trends.  Mentor #2 underscored that a MDIA re-
veals “what is emerging.”214
Corporate accelerators, where incumbent companies sponsor a 
MDIA, bet that accelerators provide learning benefits for managers and 
executives that participate as mentors.  The corporate accelerator is a 
notable trend that some believe represents the future of the accelerator 
industry.215  Corporate accelerators include Europe’s Startup Bootcamp, 
Techstars’ corporate branded accelerators (known as “Powered by 
Techstars”), the Nike Girl Effect Accelerator, and even a legal startup 
accelerator offered by LexisNexis.216  Corporate accelerators facilitate in-
teraction between startups and an incumbent sponsor’s management 
and employees, who provide free mentorship to startups that frequently 
211. For example, mentor #5 highlighted the value of working with other mentors in 
helping a portfolio company. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #5, supra note
17.
212. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #1 (Apr. 6, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).
213. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #10 (Apr. 16, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
214. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #2 (Apr. 6, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).
215. See Interview with Accelerator Rep #14 (June 23, 2014) (notes on file with author); 
Interview with Accelerator Rep #29 (June 22, 2016) (notes on file with author).  For general 
overview of corporate accelerators, see Hochberg, supra note 44, at 16, 44; What Corporate In-
cubators and Accelerators Can Mean for Your Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/287495 [https://perma.cc/6AUF-24MV]. 
216. Startupbootcamp is a global family of industry-focused startup accelerators,
STARTUPBOOTCAMP, https://www.startupbootcamp.org/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/5Q3V-SALJ] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017); The Sprint Accelerator is a Hub for 
Corporate Innovation & Entrepreneurial Engagement, SPRINT ACCELERATOR, http://sprintac-
cel.com [https://perma.cc/9DLS-SR6B] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017); THE GIRL EFFECT
ACCELERATOR, http://girleffectaccelerator.com/ [https://perma.cc/BWG2-RNX6] (last vis-
ited Jun. 5, 2017). LexisNexis Launches New Legal Tech Accelerator in Silicon Valley, LEX
MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lexisnexis-launches-new-legal-tech-ac-
celerator-in-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/7XLS-6MKP]. 
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aim to upend their industry.217  Other industry specialists, who are not 
part of incumbent company sponsors, join the corporate accelerator 
mentor pool as well.218  The corporate accelerator promises the incum-
bent access to new talent and ideas.  Startups participate, in turn, in or-
der to get access to industry knowledge and professional connections. 
A second IIB available to MDIA mentors is social capital.  Social cap-
ital is an “advantage created by a person’s location in a structure of re-
lationships.”219  Accelerators amplify network benefits through activi-
ties and tools designed to broker useful connections.  An event that 
convenes mentors in a common setting, such as a mentor-only dinner, 
is typical at the outset of accelerator programs.220  Mentors also interact 
with one another while advising portfolio companies contemporane-
ously, such as a pitch practice or a group mentor meeting.221  Physical 
proximity between mentors, moreover, is augmented by technology 
tools.  For example, the application Conspire offered a dedicated 
Techstars network that promised to inform a mentor “exactly how to 
get the best introduction to whoever you want to meet —a customer, 
employer or investor and as a mentor.”222  Mentor #9 observed, “I don’t 
know how much it would have cost to organize [this network for] my-
self.”223  This reflects an assessment that the mentor’s unilateral contri-
butions toward a portfolio company were, in turn, rewarded by high 
value connections to others in the accelerator network. 
A third type of IIB relates to entrepreneurial finance. For angel in-
vestors, the opportunity to interact with other MDIA mentors expands 
an individual’s “deal flow”—i.e., leads to opportunities to invest in 
217. See Hochberg, supra note 44, at 1. 
218. Incumbent companies may also realize outsource research and development gains. 
219. See RONALD BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
CAPITAL 4 (2005). 
220. For example, Techstars program kicks off with a mentor dinner where mentors dine 
together, new mentors are introduced, and a sneak peek at the incoming cohort is revealed. 
221. METRICK, supra note 4, at 3.
222. Techstars Mentor Newsletter Q1, Mar. 10, 2015 (on file with author).  The message 
notes that the “network size as of January 2015, is 936 members, which connect to 736,952 
first-degree contacts and 3,233,818 second-degree contacts. TS network members have sent 
each other 1.5 million messages to date.”  In August 2016, FullContact announced that it ac-
quired Conspire. See Bart Lorang, FullContact Acquires Conspire, FULLCONTACT BLOG (Aug. 
17, 2016), https://www.fullcontact.com/blog/fullcontact-acquires-conspire/
[https://perma.cc/YV4N-UA8C]. 
223. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108. 
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other companies.224  For entrepreneurs, the opportunity to interact with 
other MDIA mentors may lead to financing of their own ventures.225
The experience of Matt Van Horn provides an example of how general-
ized exchange rewards MDIA participation in the absence of contract.226
Van Horn was an experienced entrepreneur, having co-founded 
Zimride (now known as Lyft).227  Van Horn became involved with 
Techstars.228  Van Horn gave a unilateral contribution: a day of help 
mentoring portfolio companies in the Boulder program.229  An indirect 
benefit subsequently circulated back to Van Horn through a relation-
ship with an investor.  Through mentoring Van Horn met another 
Techstars mentor, Brad Feld, a managing director with venture capital 
fund Foundry Group.230  When Van Horn went to found his next ven-
ture, June Life, the connection with Foundry Group was already in 
place.  Foundry Group funded June Life in April 2014.231
Finally, a fourth type of IIB involves future employment opportuni-
ties. Functional specialist mentors—such as lawyers, finance experts, 
and marketers—know that MDIA portfolio companies operate with 
limited resources.232  While a MDIA portfolio company might engage a 
functional specialist after a program concludes, a more likely benefit for 
a functional specialist is that another mentor engages the specialist or 
recommends the specialist to others.233
B. External indirect benefits include reputation gains 
Participation in generalized giving systems also gives rise to re-
wards, defined here as external indirect benefits (“EIBs”) that are cap-
tured from interactions outside the system itself.  Pecuniary gains are 
found through interactions with third parties who are not part of the 
MDIA network. Figure 5 diagrams how MDIA participants capture EIBs 
224. MANGUM, supra note 53, at 28.
225. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108. 
226. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #14 (June 21, 2014) (notes on file 
with author). 
227.   Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #17, supra note 134. 
233. Functional specialists, such as legal providers, also feel compelled to sponsor accel-
erators so that they are visible and present. Id.
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from third parties outside of a generalized system.  Collaborator 1 uni-
laterally helps collaborator 2.  Collaborator 1 is later rewarded in a trans-
action with a third party outsider who is not part of the MDIA network. 
 
Figure 5: External indirect benefits realized by a generalized sys-
tem participant 
 
Investigation shows two common types of EIBs: (i) exploitation of 
learning benefits; and (ii) reputation gains. Learning benefits, as dis-
cussed in Section IV.A supra, present a type of IIB available to mentors.  
The value of learning benefits is often realized through external interac-
tions.  Peer production contexts show how learning benefits may be re-
alized vis-à-vis third parties.234  Open source software, for example, il-
lustrates how EIBs present economic benefits that flow from learning 
benefits associated with generalized exchange participation.235  Open 
source software is collectively created through fragmented voluntary 
contributions and, subject to license terms, then given away for free to 
the public.236  Contributors to open source projects often do not secure 
 
234. Benkler labels this “indirect appropriation.”  See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 
41, 405 n.76 (“appropriation of the value of one’s effort by means other than reliance on the 
excludability of the product of the effort”). 
235. Id. at 371 n.2, 386. 
236. It is estimated that over half of the developers in open source projects are employ-
ees with for-profit or non-profit entities.  Barnett, supra note 165, at 1805, 1809, 1811 (“sponsor 
firms can accrue premia on proprietary applications . . . that run on that base”). 
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direct compensation.237  But contributing firms and individuals, who be-
come familiar with the open source software through their involvement 
in its creation, then sell complementary services and goods to third par-
ties.238  The magnitude of gains from EIB strategies can be significant.239
IBM reported that it earned $2 billion in server sales revenue from a $1 
billion open source investment.240
Mentors similarly appropriate reputational benefits through third 
party interactions with parties outside the accelerator system.  Reputa-
tion serves as a shortcut to identify wealth creation opportunities and 
mitigate opportunistic behavior amid conditions of high information 
asymmetry and uncertainty.  Private entrepreneurial ventures exhibit 
high variance in outcomes.241  As discussed in Section III.A supra, infor-
mation asymmetries exist between what entrepreneurs know about 
their companies versus what others know about their companies.242
Much information about entrepreneurial skills and capabilities are dif-
ficult to obtain in private company settings.  The accelerator imprimatur 
signals to those outside an accelerator that the mentor “know[s] things,” 
a reputational enhancement captured in pecuniary terms through third 
party interactions.243  Reputation established through MDIA participa-
tion may also serve as a bond.  Where a mentor misbehaves vis-à-vis a 
third party, a network capable of administering reputational sanctions 
237. Id. at 1809 n.128. 
238. Id. at 1805, 1809, 1811 (“sponsor firms can accrue premia on proprietary applica-
tions . . . that run on that base”). 
239. IBM alone invested over $200 million annually to Linux development, and other 
companies such as Intel, HP and Novell pursue similar strategies.  See, e.g., Don Clark, IBM 
Again Pledges $1 Billion to a Linux Effort, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2013, 5:57 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/09/16/ibm-again-pledges-1-billion-to-a-linux-effort/
[https://perma.cc/UFR2-PMDJ]; TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 70; Bessen, supra
note 110, at 1. 
240.  Stephen Shankland, IBM’s Linux Revenue: Services to Overtake Servers, CNET (Aug. 
2, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/ibms-linux-revenue-services-to-overtake-
servers/ [https://perma.cc/6XXQ-XFRA].  In this way, open source software may be under-
stood as a form of generalized exchange: a participant’s unilateral contributions to a project 
results in rewards latently captured through indirect interactions with others. 
241. JOSH LERNER, supra note 213, at 4 (citing high variance in performance at twenty-
five and seventy-five percentiles in private equity). 
242. In terms of past performance, information can be hard to access and reliable data 
points can be difficult to surface about how an individual’s performance affected the outcome 
of a startup (e.g., did market conditions and timing create a(n) (un)lucky outcome?). 
243. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #1, supra note 211. Accelerators 
highlight mentors in myriad ways, as discussed in Part IV, that burnish reputations to those 
outside of the MDIA network. 
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for misbehavior is available.244
Investigation shows ways that mentors vis-a-vis third party interac-
tions capture reputational benefits. Mentor #13 reported that accelerator 
engagement promoted her fractional work as a CFO outside the accel-
erator.245  Mentor #7 reported reputational benefits that helped his dig-
ital marketing work with outside parties,246 and Mentor #6 said that the 
accelerator powerfully affected his PR business.247  Reputational bene-
fits are such that one individual, who was in between jobs, reported that 
a recruiter advised him to try and join an accelerator network as a men-
tor.248
Investors similarly benefit from reputation gains associated with 
mentorship. Mentor #8, for example, is an angel investor who began 
MDIA mentoring in accelerators in 2009.249  He initially viewed acceler-
ators as a direct pipeline for investment opportunities.250  Over time, 
however, the investment pipeline shifted.  Today over 50% of Mentor 
#8’s investment deals, while outside of the MDIA networks, come re-
ferred by individuals that were once helped by Mentor #8 within an ac-
celerator.251  The expanded deal flow pipeline complements other aca-
demic research about the economic value of reputation in venture 
capital.  David Hsu found that entrepreneurs are more likely to accept 
offers from high reputation VCs and, moreover, are willing to take a 
significant discount in an VC deal in order to work with higher reputa-
tion VCs.252  An investor that provides help to portfolio companies in an 
accelerator, to the extent such help is visible to third parties, sends a 
244. See Bernthal, supra note 1, at 146, 178–79. 
245. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #13 (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on file 
with author). 
246. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #7 (Apr. 15, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).
247. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #6 (Apr. 9, 2015) (notes on file with 
author).
248. Discussion with former student who recently left a “unicorn” startup and was look-
ing for next position. 
249. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79. 
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. “Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be ac-
cepted, and high-reputation VCs acquire start-up equity at a 10–14% discount.”  Hsu explains 
that high reputation VCs provide a startup greater “certification value.”  This helps explain 
why a startup would accept what appears to be lesser deal terms from a high reputation VC 
rather than work with a lesser known VC.  See David Hsu, What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for 
Venture Capital Affiliation?, 59 J. FIN. 1805, 1805–06 (2004). 
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signal to the market that the investor is active in the community and is 
entrepreneur friendly.253  Such activity burnishes an investor’s reputa-
tion.  To the extent that reputation is enhanced, this makes it more likely 
that the investor will secure desirable deals on better terms in the future. 
V. WHO NEEDS A CONTRACT? CONDITIONS WHERE MDIA
VOLUNTEERISM SUCCEEDS OR FAILS
This Section identifies conditions where informal tools substitute for 
contract to induce mentor contributions.  A range of tools promote men-
tor volunteerism.254  MDIA strategies to attract mentors function in sim-
ilar ways to contractual provisions insofar as they incentivize and shape 
behavior of participants.  Effective generalized exchange systems gen-
erate economic benefits for participants when a virtuous cycle promotes 
unilateral giving and deters free riding.255  Sustaining volunteer mentor 
participation is a necessary, if not sufficient part, of a viable MDIA sys-
tem.256
The insight that MDIAs are a generalized exchange system points 
up the utility of prior studies that examine conditions where general-
ized exchange succeeds and fails.  This Section distills academic work 
253. On the competitive importance that an investor is viewed as “friendly” to a startup 
and its management team, see Ben Marcus, What Makes a Founder-Friendly Investor? One 
founder’s perspective, MEDIUM BLOG (Apr. 10, 2016), https://medium.com/@Fly-
ingBenji/what-makes-a-founder-friendly-investor-6573b770cf18 [https://perma.cc/ST5T-
MCUB] (noting that investors “strive to set themselves apart by building a ‘founder-friendly’ 
reputation.”).
254. These tools are detailed in Section V.A–C below. 
255. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 145 (“critical mass of contributions can be harnessed, 
it may spark a sort of ‘virtuous cycle’ that leads groups featuring generalized exchange to 
achieve productivity and maintain group members’ giving . . . At the same time, generalized 
exchange systems that are unable to overcome this ‘start-up’ problem are likely to crumble, 
as their low productivity will fail to produce pro-group sentiments that are uniquely critical 
to the maintenance of giving in such systems.  This stands in stark contrast to direct exchange 
systems, which should not require solidarity to function. Such systems can survive on self-
interest”).
256. This observation is tautological insofar as the “mentor driven” part of a MDIA re-
lies upon volunteers.  Beyond the tautology, however, the interesting question surrounds 
how expertise will be organized within accelerators over the long term.  In order to prove an 
enduring institutional form, private MDIAs must provide sufficient return on capital to in-
vestors after fees and costs are paid to accelerator intermediaries.  To accomplish this, MDIAs 
must provide value to startups that justifies an entrepreneur’s decision to exchange startup 
equity as well as accept the opportunity costs associated with three to four months of MDIA 
participation.  Mentors provide the expertise required to help MDIAs create more valuable 
portfolio companies.  If high caliber experts refuse to volunteer for a MDIA, then another 
organizational approach will be required to mobilize expert inputs. 
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on generalized exchange and combines it with evidence collected 
through interviews with individuals active within MDIAs.  Figure 6 
highlights three types of motivation (“Classes of Motivation”) that best 
account for willingness to participate in generalized exchange.257
Figure 6: Classes of Motivation For Participation 
Classes of Motivation
Instrumental: economic benefits in exchange for mentor par-
ticipation
Volunteerism: feelings associated with mentor involvement 
Norms: expected behavior within a MDIA environment 
For each Class of Motivation, this Section identifies factors that de-
termine whether a MDIA facilitates the Class at high or low levels.  
These factors, called the “Viability Factors,” are determinants of where 
volunteerism is viable over time.  Where Viability Factors are present at 
high levels across each Class, a MDIA enjoys a collaborative environ-
ment that facilitates generalized exchange. Where the Viability Factors 
are low, in contrast, it should be expected that alternative methods—
such as formal legal tools with direct compensation—are required to 
structure collaboration between experts and startups.  Subsections A–C 
below examines each of the Classes of Motivation and their respective 
Viability Factors in turn. 
A. Instrumental Motivations 
Instrumental motivations refer to economic benefits available to 
MDIA participants.  As set forth in Figure 7, three Viability Factors drive 
whether generalized exchange is economically attractive: (i) system 
quality, (ii) cost of mentor / mentee agreements, and (iii) circulation of 
indirect internal benefits (IIBs) and external indirect benefits (EIBs). 
257. Divining the motivation behind behavior is not easy.  Motivation varies across in-
dividuals.  Individual mentors, moreover, self-report a mix of different motivations.  Finally, 
self-reporting of motives is not fully reliable, making it difficult to accurately know the moti-
vation behind a behavior. 
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Figure 7: Summary of Instrumental Class of Motivation
Motivation Class ViabilityFactors
MDIA Strategies to 
Promote Generalized 
Exchange
Instrumental: eco-
nomic benefits in ex-
change for mentor 
participation
High System 
Quality
Selectivity in mentor 
and portfolio com-
pany admission 
High Cost of 
Mentor / 
Mentee Agree-
ments
Recruit mentors who 
do not need direct 
compensation
Free Circula-
tion of IIBs and 
EIBs
Boost mentor-mentor 
interactions; heighten 
public profiles of 
mentors
System quality is determined by the skill level of individuals involved 
in a MDIA combined with a MDIA’s external reputation.  In economic 
terms, a risk discount is involved in generalized exchange due to the 
fact that direct compensation is neither specified nor secured via con-
tract.  Participants must bear the risk that general exchange will fail and 
that benefits will not circulate back.  High system quality enhances the 
likelihood of valuable indirect benefits. For example, learning benefits—
a type of IIB described in Section IV.A supra—are more promising where 
a MDIA attracts high functioning entrepreneurs mentored by highly 
skilled mentors.  Moreover, when a MDIA has a high reputation vis-à-
vis third parties outside of the MDIA, mentor engagement can reliably 
be expected to generate EIBs.  Finally, recall that mentors and mentees 
have a mutual option for post accelerator engagement.  Where portfolio 
companies are led by entrepreneurs with exceptional potential, the pos-
sibility of a future relationship is more attractive.  The importance of 
system quality underscores why successful MDIAs “don’t take donkeys 
to the Kentucky Derby.”258  MDIA strategies associated with selectivity 
258. Legendary Tennessee basketball coach Pat Summit highlighted this advice from 
her father about the importance of recruiting talented, high caliber players.  Following a loss, 
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and recruitment of mentors and portfolio companies are powerful de-
terminants as to whether generalized exchange will succeed.  Toward 
this end, accelerator promoters often try to engage high profile individ-
uals, such as well-known venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, capable 
of recruiting others into the network.259  The importance of system qual-
ity also suggests caution for efforts to sustain the MDIA model in loca-
tions lacking a critical mass of high caliber mentors and entrepreneurs.  
Accelerators outside of entrepreneurial geographies are more likely to 
struggle to generate economically valuable indirect benefits that re-
dound to mentors. 
Cost of mentor / mentee agreements refers to the challenges and trans-
action costs involved in crafting formal contracts ex ante between ex-
perts and portfolio companies.  The value of flexibility in expert / 
startup relationship afforded by the MDIA may exceed the benefits of a 
stable and well defined expert relationship.  One mentor, for example, 
highlighted that early stage company advisory board relationships are 
largely ineffective. 260  A startup has difficulty defining the scope of its 
needs and, even once defined, rapid changes to a startup’s business 
model render needs obsolete.261  Early stage startups face similar chal-
lenges in formalizing director roles and consulting relationships.  The 
informality of the MDIA mentor relationship prevents lock in at a time 
of rapid changes to the company. 
Meanwhile, while perhaps counterintuitive, investigation shows 
that certain desirable mentors—such as VCs and some CEOs—are more 
attracted to MDIAs if they serve as volunteers rather than as compen-
sated professionals.262  One reason is that the costs and frictions for cer-
tain experts to enter into formal agreement exceed the expected benefits. 
For example, professional investors such as venture capitalists typically 
Summit’s dad admonished her that she should go get some racehorses if she wanted to suc-
ceed as a collegiate coach. KEN COLEMAN, ONE QUESTION: LIFE-CHANGING ANSWERS FROM 
TODAY’S LEADING VOICES 67 (2013).
259. Accelerators are sometimes nested within or affiliated with a larger venture capital 
firm or have a national venture capital arm that has the option to invest in subsequent rounds 
of funding.  One example of this model is exercised by Dreamit. See Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, DREAMIT, http://www.dreamit.com/faq-1/#faq [https://perma.cc/UJ7T-LEXG] (last 
visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
260. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79. 
261. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 147–49, 185. 
262. People are sometimes willing to work for free but not for compensation.  See
ARIELY, supra note 207, at 71 (citing instances in which lawyers refused to work for AARP at 
a discounted rate, however, attorneys were willing to do free work for AARP). 
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have restrictive covenants in their fund agreements with limited part-
ners.  A common restrictive covenant prohibits VCs from entering into 
separate agreements for direct compensation outside of their “day job” 
as a venture capitalist.263  Waivers of a restrictive covenant could be ob-
tained from limited partners.  But the cost, time and hassle associated 
with securing waivers would chill MDIA participation.  Duty of loyalty 
is another factor that, similarly, makes it easier for a MDIA not to pay 
an expert. One mentor—a CEO—said that he would refuse cash com-
pensation for his mentor work due to “a conflict of interest with my ex-
isting business.”264  In short, for certain mentors, the MDIA strategy to 
informally organize experts lowers the frictions associated with mentor-
ship.
MDIAs recruit mentors who do not need direct compensation and, 
more specifically, can internalize the value of IIBs and EIBs.  For exam-
ple, consider an angel investor who through MDIA mentorship (i) 
learns difficult to obtain information about an emerging industry sector 
that a MDIA portfolio company is involved in, and (ii) becomes well 
known in a geographic area as an entrepreneur friendly expert.  These 
indirect benefits are economically significant for the angel.  The angel 
internalizes value when she uses industry-specific information to eval-
uate an investment opportunity in the sector.  And she internalizes rep-
utational benefits when a desirable startup accepts her money into a 
competitive deal because she is regarded as “smart money.”  In contrast, 
the same indirect benefits would be economically irrelevant to a dentist 
with no interest in private investing or startups. 
Circulation of IIBs and EIBs describes the rewards realized among par-
ticipants within the MDIA generalized exchange.  The description of 
IIBs and EIBs in Section IV shows how economic benefits are significant 
even in the absence of direct compensation.  It should be emphasized, 
moreover, that the “costs” of mentor participation involve the contribu-
tion of information goods.265  The nature of MDIA mentorship is infor-
mation oriented—i.e., a mentor shares her tacit knowledge, creative 
ideas, and other forms of know-how. Where mentors co-create and 
263. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 169.  A common covenant limits the startup activity a gen-
eral partner can engage in outside of a VC fund.  GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 144, at 78–
79.
264. “It is not a written business agreement. But I would view it as a conflict.”  Interview 
with Anonymous Mentor #2, supra note 23. 
265. Information goods contributed by a mentor, unlike physical inputs, are non-ex-
haustible: a mentor keeps a copy of ideas generated through help to a startup.
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share ideas, mentorship is comparatively less costly—and even benefi-
cial—in an information environment where giving away ideas involves 
keeping a copy of the idea, too.266
B. Volunteerism Motivation 
The Class of Volunteerism refers to non-economic motives that arise 
from a mentor’s feelings about MDIA involvement.267  Simplified mod-
els of human behavior, particularly models that assume economic max-
imizing goals and rationality, overlook other factors that animate col-
laboration.268  MDIAs function best when they preserve feelings of 
mentor volunteerism such that market norms do not dominate interac-
tions, even amid economically valuable exchanges.269  Figure 8 shows 
three Viability Factors that most powerfully affect mentor feelings of 
volunteerism: (i) visibility of mentor conduct, (ii) conditions of generos-
ity, and (iii) fun. 
266. Coye Cheshire, Selective Incentives and Generalized Information Exchange 70 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 82, 82–83 (2007).  This also suggests that MDIAs may have a built in safe guard 
against free riding. Meaningful mentor participation with portfolio companies is necessary 
to gather learning benefits and reputation gains among those involved in the accelerator. 
267. Whether motivation is intrinsic to an individual or externally imposed separates 
the Volunteerism Class of motivations from the Norms Class, discussed in Section V.C.
Norms are externally imposed expectations of behavior.  Volunteerism speaks to behaviors 
driven an individual’s internal motivations. 
268. See Cimino, supra note 32, at 128 (noting that transaction cost economics assumes a 
normative goal of efficiency, “yet behaviorists and other economists are exploring the possi-
bility that economic exchange could be motivated in part by other values”); GRANT, supra
note 39, at 169. See generally STOUT, supra note 39. For survey of research about how cognitive 
biases systematically frustrates rational decision-making, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING
FAST AND SLOW (2011).
269. Successful generalized exchange systems create a “veil of altruism” around partic-
ipant behavior.” See Willer et al., supra note 11, at 148. Ariely provides a clear illustration of 
how mixing social and transactional realms can be problematic.  As a Thanksgiving dinner 
guest at the in-laws, it would be appropriate to bring a gift—say, a fine bottle of wine worth 
$50.  It would be inappropriate to start dinner by offering your host $50 in cash. The wine gift 
keeps the exchange in the realm of social norms.  The cash gift moves the exchange into the 
realm of transactional market norms.  See ARIELY, supra note 207, at 67–68, 76, 79.
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Figure 8: Summary of Volunteerism Class of Motivation
Motivation Class 
Generalized Ex-
change Viabil-
ity Factors 
MDIA Strategies to 
Promote General-
ized Exchange 
Volunteerism: feel-
ings associated with 
mentor involvement 
Visibility of 
Mentor Actions Selective incentives 
Generosity
Group identity; 
greater purpose; ef-
ficacy
Fun Self-selection; enjoy-able tasks 
Visibility of mentor conduct underscores that, even in the absence of 
contract, accountability tools are available within a generalized ex-
change system.270  Mechanisms that make participants’ behavior visible 
to others may be used to deter free riding,271 encourage desirable contri-
butions,272 and discipline unwanted conduct.273  Transparency about the 
behavior of generalized exchange participants “offer additional motiva-
tions that make cooperation rational even when the initial conditions of 
the social dilemma make cooperation irrational.”274  For example, en-
hanced visibility of behavior provides others the ability to “shun those 
who never give or conversely make an effort to help those who have 
270. Accountability mechanisms are known as “selective incentives” in the parlance of 
psychology and sociology.  Cheshire, supra note 265, at 82; Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1116. 
271. Generalized giving systems were generally believed to suffer where many partici-
pants free ride while only a small minority contribute.  Scholars have increasingly observed 
digital contexts, however, that defy this prediction.  Cheshire notes peer to peer settings 
where generalized exchange persists despite large discrepancies between participants who 
contribute and participants who only free ride.  The nature of information goods makes free 
riding less problematic in information-based generalized exchange. See Cheshire, supra note 
265, at 83. 
272. See id. at 85 (“In generalized information exchange, removing some degree of ano-
nymity between individuals can help to make social psychological processes act as selective 
incentives.”).
273. “Research on social dilemmas and public goods has demonstrated that people are 
more likely to cooperate if their actions are public.” Kollock, supra note 31, at 233. For exam-
ple, as part of “NetDay 1996” – a state-wide effort to wire California schools on March 9, 1996 
– organizers drove high levels of involvement by listings rankings of corporations’ volunteer 
contributions based on how many people from a company participated. 
274. See Cheshire, supra note 265, at 85. 
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contributed in the past.”275  Moreover, feedback to a participant about 
her own conduct, whether the feedback reflects high or low levels of 
social approval, also positively affects cooperative behavior associated 
with generalized exchange.276  Finally, a possibility for future research 
is to analyze whether visibility of conduct develops a mentor’s self-iden-
tity as an expert.277
MDIA strategies make mentor behavior visible to others within and 
outside of the accelerator.  Internally, mentors are specially recognized 
for contributions in weekly email updates from the managing director 
to a mentor network.278  A MDIA’s email missives can recognize a men-
tor who made a special contribution to a portfolio company or engaged 
in other types of desirable behavior.  Portfolio company feedback to 
mentors, where a mentor receives direct approval and critique from 
mentee companies, is used by certain accelerators.279  Mentor contribu-
tions are visible to those outside the accelerator. MDIA mentor names 
and photos are typically featured on a MDIA’s public-facing website.280
Mentors include accelerator involvement in their social media listings 
such as LinkedIn.281  Mentee portfolio companies prominently list “lead 
275. Kollock, supra note 31, at 227; see also Takahashi, supra note 30, at 1116, citing Olson 
(“[O]ne of the main solutions to the free rider problem is to impose a penalty on defectors or 
to give a reward to cooperators. These are called selective incentives (Olson 1965).”). 
276. See Cheshire, supra note 265, at 82. 
277. “Identity theory, based in symbolic interactionism, follows the dictum that ‘society 
shapes self shapes social behavior.’ From this perspective, identities are broadly recognized 
and meaningful categories that people apply to themselves and others as role players (e.g., 
doctor, lawyer, parent), group members (e.g., Asian, Catholic) and individuals (e.g., moral, 
powerful).  Tyler Wry and Jeffrey G. York, An Identity-Based Approach to Social Enterprise,
Academy of Management Review, at 6.  In press, doi: 10.5465/amr.2013.0506 (citation omit-
ted).
278. See, e.g., Techstars Boulder Mentor Update – Week 6 and 7, 2017, including a “Shoutouts 
and Gratitudes” section that highlighted special mentor and other expert contributions to 
portfolio companies during the time period (email from managing director Natty Zola, Mar. 
14, 2017) (on file with author). 
279. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #1 (Feb. 24, 
2015) (notes on file with author). 
280. See, e.g., http://straightshot.co/mentors/; Mentors, THE BRANDERY, http://brand-
ery.org/mentors [https://perma.cc/ZNN2-VABX] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017); Mentors,
TECHSTARS, http://www.techstars.com/mentors/ [https://perma.cc/JS3P-XD3P] (last vis-
ited Jun. 5, 2017). 
281.  See, e.g., LinkedIn profiles of Howard Diamond 
(https://www.linkedin.com/in/hdiamond/), Sue Heilbronner, 
(https://www.linkedin.com/in/sueheilbronner/) and Morris Wheeler 
(https://www.linkedin.com/in/mowheeler/) (last visited May 1, 2017). 
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mentors” who provide significant assistance in pitch decks that are pre-
sented to investors and others.282  The Techstars franchise has a series of 
short videos that highlight individual mentors.283  At the public Demo 
Day, which marks the end of an accelerator session, mentors usually 
stand and receive recognition.  Additionally, it is a special honor for a 
mentor to introduce a portfolio company at the public Demo Day. 
Feeling of generosity refers to a MDIA’s ability to create conditions 
that makes participants feel generous.  Unilateral contributions do not 
flourish in settings perceived as tit for tat.284  Generosity is enhanced 
where individuals: (i) believe others are likely to be generous, and 
(ii) have a sense of a greater purpose associated with involvement.  Man-
aging directors screen out would be mentors that seek quid pro quo re-
ciprocal benefits and, where mentors aggressively seek direct gain, take 
steps to deter and punish such behavior.285  MDIAs promote generosity 
by emphasizing non-pecuniary objectives advanced by mentor volun-
teerism, such as helping the next generation of entrepreneurs, commu-
nity economic development, or a mission to assist groups and causes 
that are underrepresented in the entrepreneurial community.286  A feel-
ing of efficacy—”a sense that she has some effect on this environ-
ment”287—further fosters volunteerism motivation.  Early stage startup 
companies, where mentor impact can significantly affect the trajectory 
of strategy and outcomes, likely foster feelings of efficacy better than 
larger companies that are less able to change course. 
Exchange structure affects feelings of generosity.  Direct exchange 
282. TECHSTARS, supra note 279. 
283. See Mentor Spotlight videos, available at Posts in Category “Mentor Spotlight”, 
TECHSTARS BLOG, http://www.techstars.com/content/category/mentorspotlight/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9GD-9DD2] (last visited Jun. 5, 2017). 
284. See Cheshire, supra note 265, at 86. One aspect of this is reactive behavior “wherein 
individuals tend to orient themselves towards the average behavior of other group mem-
bers.” Id. Relatedly, research on willingness to contribute to public goods shows that indi-
viduals cooperate based on how they believe others will behave. Id. at 86–87. 
285. Bernthal, supra note 1, at 188. 
286.  In this respect, an accelerator’s appeals to mentors bear similarity to the appeals of 
a National Public Radio fundraising drive, insofar as (i) an appeal highlights the social benefit 
of contribution, combined with (ii) a contributor’s trust that the system helps deliver that 
social benefit.  This highlights the role of shared values in promoting feelings of generosity.  
Thanks to Eva Yao for this observation. 
287. Kollock, supra note 31, at 220, 228. 
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makes self-interest prominent.288  In direct exchange, a participant be-
lieves that benefits primarily flow from her own abilities or the nature 
of the bilateral exchange relationship.289  In contrast, a generalized ex-
change participant believes that benefits flow from the system itself.290
Generosity is enhanced where participants experience “group identifi-
cation” and credit the generalized system—rather than oneself—as the 
source of gains associated with exchange related to the system.291  Infor-
mal structures dampen feelings of transactional calculation and, in-
stead, facilitate cooperation and a norm of giving into a system.292
MDIAs facilitate mentor generosity and encourage the unilateral contri-
butions that are the sina qua non of generalized exchange.  Interviews 
showed that the informal governance promotes feelings of volunteerism 
because, as Mentor #9 observed, payment for mentor work “would 
have felt different.  It would have been a job. There is something about 
volunteering your time . . . the idea that I was giving back that made it 
more important.”293  A mentor, who has worked in MDIAs as well as in 
accelerators where mentors are compensated, noted that the volunteer 
aspects of MDIAs make participants feel generous.294  In contrast, this 
mentor said that offers of direct compensation “chased away” desirable 
288. Direct “exchanges, and especially negotiated transactions, seem to emphasize self-
interest rather than altruism.  It is hard to create or maintain the impression that one party 
cares about the other when haggling over the terms of a contractual obligation.”  Willer et al., 
supra note 11, at 148. 
289. Benefits are “attributed more to one’s skill in negotiation or the properties of a sin-
gle dyadic relationship.”  Willer et al., supra note 11, at 125. 
290. “[T]he repeated sending of unilateral gifts among various group members should 
lead participants to attribute the source of benefit to the entire collective.”  Willer et al., supra
note 11, at 125. 
291. Willer et. al. explain that individual members within a generalized exchange system 
experience feelings of group identification. Where group identification is enhanced, this pro-
motes group solidarity – i.e., “a positive perception of the group and its members as struc-
turally interdependent, united, and cohesive.” Where solidarity is enhanced, this elicits more 
valuable contributions from a member and, moreover, lowers the likelihood of freeriding on 
the system.  Willer et al., supra note 11, at 125–28. 
292. Mentor #7 said an accelerator creates a cooperative feeling that he described as, 
“We are going to try to win together.  You don’t need to lose for me to win.” Interview with 
Anonymous Mentor #7 (Apr. 15, 2015) (on file with author.) 
293. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108.  This is consistent 
with empirical work in psychology which, suggests that tangible direct rewards significantly 
adversely affects intrinsic motivation for otherwise interesting tasks. See Deci et. al, supra
note 174, at 653 (analyzing data over 128 studies). 
294. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108. 
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mentors.295
Fun refers to inherent pleasure that a mentor takes in a MDIA task. 
Fun is tied to intrinsic motivation where participation is “interesting” to 
volunteers.296  From the perspective of a participant, interesting and fun 
projects are less costly and taxing than mundane or tedious tasks.  Vol-
unteer interest is piqued where there are opportunities to interact with 
other individuals that a collaborator wants to associate with.297  Self-se-
lection within generalized exchange, where volunteers choose where to 
offer assistance, plays an important role in fostering intrinsic motiva-
tion.  A mentor’s self-selection of where she will help portfolio compa-
nies allow her to identify desirable ways to participate. 
Many MDIAs appear to inspire mentor volunteerism, even amid 
valuable exchanges in a market-oriented, for-profit, and entrepreneurial 
environment.  Further research would be helpful to closely examine 
how MDIAs blend social and market norms and, over time, whether 
these strategies succeed.298  It remains to be seen whether instrumental 
benefits and other market factors will undercut volunteerism over time. 
But interviews suggest that, so far, instrumental motivations typically 
do not crowd out mentors’ intrinsic motivation.299  MDIA mentors re-
port that they are invigorated by the “energy,” “urgency,” “elec-
tric[ity],” “pace,” and “controlled chaos” surrounding portfolio com-
pany entrepreneurs.300  Mentor #1 said that he feels “fueled” and 
295. Interview with Jim Franklin, supra note 62. 
296. See Deci et. al, supra note 174, at 653.  Deci and others observe that “material rewards 
for a pleasant activity may decrease the intrinsic motivation to perform . . .” an activity or 
task.
297. Kollock, supra note 31, at 231 (“the intrinsic interest and challenge of the project can 
be important”). 
298. Most MDIAs are relatively new entities.  The oldest MDIAs are a decade old and 
the majority started in recent years. See Hochberg, supra note 44, at 2 (charting growth of 
accelerators).
299. See Healy & Krawiec, supra note 33, at 666 (“The crowding-out framework usefully 
elaborates the intuition that the introduction of incentives can cause people to switch their 
interpretation of an exchange, with unwanted results.  There are two relevant parts to the 
insight.  First, a price or other monetary incentive may change motives, as already discussed.  
Second, a fine or an award of money damages may act as a price.  Hence, one might be 
tempted to argue that a contract in which money damages are potentially available could 
inadvertently encourage a deliberately strategic kind of participation, with the result being a 
rise in reneging.”); see also Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 25, at 1690–93 (arguing 
that explicit incentives and judicial intervention may ‘crowd out’ behavior based on recipro-
cal fairness). 
300.  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #13 (Mar. 6, 
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“enlivened” by interactions.301  Mentor #4 commented that he got in-
volved because the accelerator is “where all the cool shit is happen-
ing.”302  Mentor #9, an experienced entrepreneur who had been out of 
the startup environment for two years, said that accelerator involve-
ment is “how I got my mojo back” in the world of entrepreneurship.303
The compressed time period of the accelerator program ratchets up the 
energy from which mentors feed.304  Mentors like the opportunity to live 
vicariously through youthful portfolio company founders.305  Several in-
terviewees noted that mentorship offers the fun of entrepreneurship 
without the unceasing burdens associated with founding and running a 
company.306
C. Norms 
Norms are a third Class of motivation in generalized exchange.  “A 
norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either 
promulgation or enforcement.”307  People are expected to behave in a 
2015) (notes on file with author). (“I kept hearing the word ‘energy’ from mentors”); Tele-
phone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108; Telephone Interview with 
Anonymous Mentor #3 (Apr. 6, 2015) (notes on file with author) (“Entrepreneurial instincts 
carry a sense of urgency . . . I love the pace.”); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor 
#12 (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on file with author) (founders are “super excited” and being around 
them “is electrifying”); Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #3 (Apr. 6, 2015) notes 
on file with author). 
301. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #1 (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with au-
thor); similarly, “I just think it is neat to talk to others who are doing interesting and exciting 
things.” Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #2 (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with author). 
302. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #4 (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with au-
thor).
303. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #9, supra note 108 (“You’ve got this 
big room, young brains, firing on all cylinders, staying up all night, on a mission.”) 
304. The accelerator is a “boot camp” where there is “no time to think, you gotta move.”  
Id.
305. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #3 (Apr. 6, 2015) (on file with au-
thor) (“In some vicarious way I get to live through the startup process. I get to think. I get to 
contribute . . . it is all great fun.  There is nothing like starting a business.” Energizing.  “I’m 
68 years old. It keeps me involved.”)  One accelerator’s managing director observed that 
working “around all these dynamic 20 somethings keeps you young.” Telephone Interview 
with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #11 (Mar. 10, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
306. “Get the rush, get the excitement.  But don’t have to do the hard work. But get to 
bask in the glory when it works out.” ; Interview with Anonymous Mentor #12 (Apr. 29, 2015) 
(on file with author) (“There is a little bit of a wash the hands thing.”).  Great place to “refuel.” 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #13 (Feb. 23, 2015) (notes 
on file with author). 
307. Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special 
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manner set forth by external rules that are socially determined.308  An 
MDIA can affect internal norms more than it can alter external norms.  
Norms external to the MDIA have social and cultural elements that are 
difficult to change.  Norms internal to the accelerator set forth expected 
behavior within the MDIA environment.   
MDIAs aggressively promote aspirational norms of unilateral giv-
ing.  A mantra of the Techstars network, for example, is “give before 
you get” (or, in a version more succinctly tailored for Twitter, 
#givefirst).309  The #givefirst expectation is widely disseminated by the 
Global Accelerator Network.310  One Managing Director observed that 
the “give first” mentality within accelerators creates a “much more cre-
ative and collaborative space” in his accelerator.311  The norm of 
#givefirst serves as a bulwark against restricted exchange expectations 
that would chill unilateral contributions to the accelerator system.  Ex-
pectations of direct reciprocity and transactional calculations would re-
duce feelings of volunteerism and intrinsic motivation.  This would risk 
“crowding out” the unilateral contributions that make a MDIA work.312
The norm of giving into an accelerator system, on faith that the system 
will ultimately return the favor, is the lynchpin of how successful accel-
erator systems operate.  As Mentor #8 observed, accelerator participa-
tion is “not about retention, is about circulation . . . .  If you try to hold 
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369–70 (1999). 
308. Id. at 369–70 (“examples range from table manners and the rules of grammar to 
country club regulations and standard business practice . . . Often a norm will result from 
(and crystallize) the gradual emergence of a consensus.”). 
309. “[#givefirst] is not altruistic – you do expect to get things in return – but you don’t 
set up the relationship to be a transactional one.” See Give Before You Get, FELDTHOUGHS, (Jan. 
1, 2013), http://www.feld.com/archives/2013/01/give-before-you-get.html 
[https://perma.cc/T758-TLCP] (distinguishing between an advisor and a mentor; an “advi-
sor says ‘I’ll help you with your company if you give me 1% of the equity’ . . . A mentor says, 
simply, “how can I help?’”); a Twitter search of #givefirst provides dozens of examples of 
how the term is used (last searched May 23, 2015). 
310. See, e.g.,  comments of a managing director who runs a non-Techstars accelerator in 
the Midwest, nothing that they try to “mirror the Techstars ethos” and seek people “who give 
before they get.” Telephone Interview with Anonymous Accelerator Representative #4 (Mar. 
17, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
311. Interview with Accelerator Representative #9 (Mar. 10, 2015) (on file with author). 
312. Along these lines, one managing director noted that formal arrangements become 
“more about the money, more about what are you going to get.” Telephone Interview with 
Anonymous Accelerator Representative #6 (Mar. 13, 2015) (notes on file with author). 
Mentor #11 said that payment would crowd out a feeling of mission. “Then it becomes com-
merce. We have a vision that [a mentor] likes.”  Telephone Interview with Anonymous Men-
tor #11 (Apr. 20, 2015) (on file with author). 
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onto the economic benefit for yourself, it is not as powerful as when it 
circulates and comes back.”313
In summary, Figure 9 shows the three Classes of motivation, which 
promote generalized exchange, as well as MDIA strategies that affect 
participant motivation.   
313. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Mentor #8, supra note 79. 
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Figure 9: Conditions for MDIA Sustainability, Based on Classes 
of Motivation, Viability Factors, and MDIA Strategies to Promote 
Generalized Exchange
Classes of Motiva-
tion
Generalized
Exchange Via-
bility Factors 
MDIA Strategies to 
Promote Generalized 
Exchange
Instrumental: eco-
nomic benefits in ex-
change for mentor 
participation
High System 
Quality
Selectivity in mentor 
and portfolio com-
pany admission 
High Cost of 
Mentor / 
Mentee Agree-
ments
Recruit mentors who 
do not need direct 
compensation
Free Circulation 
of IIBs and EIBs 
Boost mentor-mentor 
interactions; heighten 
public profiles of 
mentors
Volunteerism: feel-
ings associated with 
mentor involvement 
Visibility of 
Mentor Actions Selective incentives 
Generosity Group identity; greater purpose 
Fun Self-selection; efficacy 
Norms: expected be-
havior with MDIA 
environment
Internal norms 
support unilat-
eral contribu-
tions
Mentor manifesto 
External norms 
support unilat-
eral contribu-
tions
Broader community 
engagement
VI. CONCLUSION 
Those who architect entrepreneurial relationships must make deci-
sions about how to best organize resources. Legal tools, informal mech-
anisms, or a mix thereof are available to organize collaboration.  MDIAs 
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highlight a surprising step zero decision to rely upon social norms—
instead of contracts—within an entrepreneurial, market-based environ-
ment.  MDIAs induce experts to participate as volunteers rather than as 
contractual counterparties.  Informal MDIA strategies substitute for 
contract insofar they incentivize mentor participation and shape partic-
ipant behavior.  This Article contributes to understanding of motivation 
in the absence of direct consideration. 
Generalized exchange explains why, under certain conditions, ex-
perts are willing to volunteer within for profit MDIA information-shar-
ing environments.  MDIAs expand entrepreneurs’ access to experts.  In 
so doing, MDIAs make entrepreneur / expert interactions more rela-
tional and generalized by pulling them into a common network.  Gen-
eralized exchange also identifies strategies necessary to sustain volun-
teerism.  The secret to a MDIA’s efficacy—and its long term viability—
is to architect a system where contributors indirectly benefit in material 
ways from (1) others in the group, and (2) third parties outside of the 
group.  The MDIA case study furthers understanding of conditions 
where volunteerism co-exists with for-profit, entrepreneurial environ-
ments. 
This Article is the first to observe the connection between general-
ized exchange and MDIAs.  This invites future empirical analysis.  The 
claim that MDIAs are a generalized giving system is based on original 
qualitative research.  Yet MDIAs are not systems of pure generalized 
exchange.  MDIAs mix elements of direct exchange, including the mu-
tual option that mentors and mentees may be exercise at a later time.314
Empirical analysis could test whether MDIA participants feel like they 
are part of a generalized—as opposed to a direct exchange—system.  
Measurement tools are available, such as those used by Willer et. al. in 
comparing the feelings of FreeCycle and Craig’s List users.315  Another 
empirical opportunity would test the model developed in Section V.
The viability of mentor activity within MDIA accelerators is observable 
across geographic locations.  Accelerators operate similarly across ge-
ographies, each with different pre-existing cultural and professional 
norms, which presents a natural experiment about how informal MDIA 
organization interacts with external environments.  Finally, there is rea-
son to suspect that mentors benefit differently with respect to their abil-
ity to capture instrumental economic gains associated with IIBs and 
314. See supra Part III. 
315. Willer et al., supra note 11, at 131–33. 
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EIBs.  Analysis of which mentors benefit most and least within general-
ized exchange systems would be valuable. 
This Article is the first to bridge generalized exchange with law and 
entrepreneurship.  Legal scholars can extend this work in at least two 
ways. One, the intersection of generalized exchange practices and pub-
lic law invites future inquiries into the “the relation between private 
norms and public laws.”316  As noted in Section II.A supra, MDIAs lead 
a broad trend in startup volunteerism.  Other entrepreneurial support 
institutions, in addition to MDIAs, assemble expert rosters.  These ex-
perts work in open information sharing environments to provide help 
to new startups.  If volunteerism and informal collaboration are a per-
manent part of 21st Century innovation processes, how does this new 
reality square with public laws in areas that assume a more competitive 
and less cooperative commercial environment?  This presents intriguing 
questions in employment, corporations, and intellectual property law.   
Two, generalized exchange literature promises to deepen under-
standing of pro-social behaviors in market and corporate environments.  
Legal scholars observe pro-social conduct in examinations of negative 
legal spaces, peer production, and other commercial contexts.  General-
ized exchange invites a more nuanced examination of human and cor-
porate behavior.  It suggests that the structure of exchange—e.g., how a 
transaction is organized—has consequences beyond higher or lower 
transaction costs.  MDIAs underscore that those who architect collabo-
ration should consider how the structure of exchange affect partici-
pants’ socio-economic motivation as well as the character of collabora-
tion’s outputs. 
316. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 306, at 369–70 n.1. 
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